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The Law of Cyber-Attack 
Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, 
Aileen Nowlan, William Perdue & Julia Spiegel* 
Cyber-attacks have become increasingly common in recent 
years. Capable of shutting down nuclear centrifuges, air defense 
systems, and electrical grids, cyber-attacks pose a serious threat to 
national security. As a result, some have suggested that cyber-attacks 
should be treated as acts of war. Yet the attacks look little like the 
armed attacks that the law of war has traditionally regulated. This 
Article examines how existing law may be applied—and adapted and 
amended—to meet the distinctive challenge posed by cyber-attacks. It 
begins by clarifying what cyber-attacks are and how they already are 
regulated by existing bodies of law, including the law of war, 
international treaties, and domestic criminal law. This review makes 
clear that existing law effectively addresses only a small fraction of 
potential cyber-attacks. The law of war, for example, provides a 
useful framework for only the very small number of cyber-attacks that 
amount to an armed attack or that take place in the context of an 
ongoing armed conflict. This Article concludes that a new, 
comprehensive legal framework at both the domestic and 
international levels is needed to more effectively address cyber-
attacks. The United States could strengthen its domestic law by 
giving domestic criminal laws addressing cyber-attacks extra-
territorial effect and by adopting limited, internationally permissible 
countermeasures to combat cyber-attacks that do not rise to the level 
of armed attacks or that do not take place during an ongoing armed 
conflict. Yet the challenge cannot be met by domestic reforms alone. 
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International cooperation will be essential to a truly effective legal 
response. New international efforts to regulate cyber-attacks must 
begin with agreement on the problem—which means agreement on 
the definition of cyber-attack, cyber-crime, and cyber-warfare. This 
would form the foundation for greater international cooperation on 
information sharing, evidence collection, and criminal prosecution of 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, Iran’s nuclear program ground to a halt, the subject of a 
sophisticated attack that sent centrifuges spinning wildly out of control. The 
weapon? Stuxnet, a computer “worm” that appears to have many authors from 
around the world and was likely tested by Americans and Israelis at the Israeli 
Dimona complex in the Negev desert.1 
A few months later, a so-called “distributed denial of service” attack took 
the entire population of Burma off the Internet immediately preceding the 
country’s first national election in twenty years.2 Observers suspect that the 
military junta in Burma coordinated the attack to shut down the Internet and 
thereby restrict the free flow of information,3 but American public officials 
1. The seeds for this attack were apparently sown well before 2010. The worm was first 
detected in 2008, when it infected networks around the world. It did no damage to most systems. At 
first, it was assumed that the attack, which appeared to target nuclear facilities in Iran, was not 
successful. Yet, in the fall of 2010, reports spread that Iran’s uranium enriching capabilities had been 
diminished. The Stuxnet Worm: A Cyber-Missile Aimed at Iran?, ECONOMIST BABBAGE BLOG (Sept. 
24, 2010, 1:32 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/stuxnet_worm; see also 
Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet Worm ‘Targeted High-Value Iranian Assets,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2010, 
6:46 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11388018; William J. Broad et al., Israeli Tests 
Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1. Stuxnet is the first 
computer virus known to be capable of specifically targeting and destroying industrial systems such as 
nuclear facilities and power grids. Fildes, supra.  
2. Burma Hit by Massive Net Attack Ahead of Election, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2010, 3:33 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11693214. 
3. See id. 
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have resisted blaming the attack on the government, even as they have 
criticized the election.4 
In the summer of 2011, evidence emerged of a long-suspected 
government-sanctioned cyber-attack program in China. In late August, a state 
television documentary aired on the government-run China Central Television 
appeared to capture an in-progress distributed denial of service attack by 
China’s military on a Falun Gong website based in Alabama.5 This revelation 
followed on the heels of a report by the McAfee cyber-security company 
suggesting that a “state actor”—widely believed to be China—had engaged in a 
years-long cyber-attack program aimed at a range of governments, U.S. 
corporations, and United Nations groups.6 
What law governs these attacks? Some have referred to these and similar 
attacks as “cyber-warfare,” suggesting that the law of war might apply.7 Yet the 
attacks look little like the armed conflict that the law of war traditionally 
regulates. And if they are “warfare,” does that mean that victims of such attacks 
might claim the right to use conventional force in self-defense—potentially 
legally authorizing Iran, for example, to respond to Stuxnet with a physical 
attack? 
This Article examines these questions and, in the process, offers new 
insights into how existing law may be applied—and adapted and amended—to 
meet the distinctive challenge posed by cyber-attacks. It does so in two 
principal ways. First, the Article clarifies what cyber-attacks are and how they 
relate to existing bodies of law, including the law of war;8 recent international 
4. See, e.g., Barack Obama & Michelle Obama, Remarks by the President and the First Lady 
in Town Hall with Students in Mumbai, India (Nov. 7, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/the-press-office/2010/11/07/remarks-president-and-first-lady-town-hall-with-students-mumbai-
india; Barack Obama, Statement by President Obama on Burma’s November 7 Elections (Nov. 7, 
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/07/statement-president-
obama-burmas-november-7-elections. 
5. Ellen Nakashima & William Wan, China’s Denials on Cyberattacks Undercut, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 24, 2011, at A12. 
6. David Barboza & Kevin Drew, Security Firm Sees Global Cyberspying, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
3, 2011, at A11. This was not the first suggestion of a program of cyber-attacks on private and 
government actors by China. Computer attacks on Google that originated in China were believed to be 
part of a broader political and corporate espionage effort and prompted Google to withdraw from the 
Chinese market. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Ellen Nakashima, Google Attack Part of Vast Campaign; 
Targets Are of Strategic Importance to China, Where Scheme Is Thought to Originate, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 14, 2010, at A1. 
7. See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 6 (2010); Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in 
Cyber Warfare, J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 155, 162 (2010) (“Cyber warfare, as that term is used 
here, refers to conflicts that utilize cyber or electronic weapons either offensively or defensively, or 
both.”); Understanding Cyber Warfare, LAWS.COM, http://cyber.laws.com/cyber-warfare (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2012). 
8. For simplicity’s sake, this Article refers collectively to jus in bello and jus ad bellum as the 
“law of war.” 
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efforts to directly regulate cyber-attacks; international bodies of law that may 
be used to indirectly regulate cyber-attacks; and domestic criminal law. 
Second, the Article demonstrates how existing law is deficient and what 
needs to be done to improve it. Although such bodies of law do offer some 
tools for responding to cyber-attacks, these tools are far from complete or 
adequate. The law of war, for example, provides a useful legal framework for 
regulating only the very small slice of cyber-attacks that amount to an armed 
attack or that take place in the context of an ongoing armed conflict. Other 
existing legal frameworks—both domestic and international—offer equally 
fragmentary assistance in policing cyber-attacks through law. Examining 
existing law leads to a clear conclusion: a new, comprehensive legal framework 
is needed to address cyber-attacks. 
The terms “cyber-attack,” “cyber-warfare,” and “cyber-crime” are 
frequently used with little regard for what they are meant to include. This lack 
of clarity can make it all the more difficult to design a meaningful legal 
response. We therefore begin this Article in Part I by defining these terms. This 
may seem a mundane task, but it is a critical starting point for any reform 
effort. To that end, we define “cyber-attack” as “any action taken to undermine 
the functions of a computer network for a political or national security 
purpose.” We also explain the difference between “cyber-attacks,” “cyber-
warfare,” and “cyber-crime,” and describe three common forms of cyber-
attacks: distributed denial of service attacks, planting inaccurate information, 
and infiltration of a secure computer network.9 
In Part II, we turn to examining how the law of war might govern cyber-
attacks. We parse the way the law of war, most of which was developed at a 
time when cyber-attacks were inconceivable, applies to this new zone of 
conflict. We first apply jus ad bellum—the law governing a state’s right to 
resort to armed force—to cyber-attacks. We conclude that most cyber-attacks 
do not rise to the level of an armed attack and thus do not justify the use of 
armed force in response. “Cyber-warfare” is thus a term properly used only to 
refer to the small subset of cyber-attacks that do constitute armed attacks or that 
occur in the context of an ongoing armed conflict. This definition is crucial 
because it limits the application of the “war” framework to those actions that 
actually constitute “war” as a matter of international law. With the scope of 
cyber-warfare clear, we then explore how jus in bello—the law governing 
conduct in an armed conflict—applies. 
9. This definition differs from that currently applied by the U.S. Cyber Command, which uses 
the term “Cyber Attack” to apply only to attacks that cause physical damage to property or injury to 
persons. E-mail from Gary D. Brown, Col. U.S. Airforce, Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Cyber 
Command to author (May 15, 2012 10:07AM) (on file with author). Our terminology allows 
differentiation between those attacks that are covered by the law of armed conflict (which we call 
cyber-warfare) and those that violate the norm of nonintervention but are not covered by the law of 
armed conflict (which we call cyber-attack). 
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Because the law of war regulates only a small subset of cyber-attacks, in 
Part III we examine other existing legal regimes that could regulate cyber-
attacks. These include (1) the law of countermeasures, which governs how 
states may respond to international law violations that do not justify uses of 
force in self-defense; (2) international agreements and other cooperative efforts 
to directly regulate cyber-attacks; (3) international agreements that regulate 
means or locations of cyber-attacks, including telecommunications, aviation, 
space, satellites, and the sea; and (4) U.S. criminal law regulating cyber-attacks. 
We conclude that, as with the law of war, these existing bodies of law 
effectively address only a small part of the problem—leaving many harmful 
cyber-attacks unregulated and uncontrolled by either domestic or international 
law. 
Finally, in Part IV we consider how the problem of cyber-attacks might be 
more effectively addressed, offering recommendations for both domestic and 
international reforms. At the domestic level, states may expand the 
extraterritorial reach of domestic criminal law and develop plans for the 
deployment of customary countermeasures in response to cyber-attacks. Yet an 
effective solution to this global challenge cannot be achieved by individual 
states acting alone. It will require global cooperation. We therefore outline the 
key elements of a cyber-treaty—namely, codifying clear definitions of cyber-
warfare and cyber-attack and providing guidelines for international cooperation 
on evidence collection and criminal prosecution—that would provide a more 
comprehensive and long-term solution to the emerging threat of cyber-attacks. 
I. 
WHAT IS A CYBER-ATTACK? 
The first challenge in evaluating how domestic and international law 
might be used to address cyber-attacks is to determine the nature and scope of 
the problem we face. Activities in cyberspace defy many of the traditional 
categories and principles that govern armed conflict under the law of war. This 
Part first offers a precise definition of “cyber-attack.” This step is not only 
necessary to the legal analysis that follows, but it also fills a gap in the existing 
literature, which often uses the term without clarifying what it is meant to 
include and exclude. We then offer three categories of activities that fall within 
this definition, illuminating the extraordinary range of activities that fall under 
even a carefully constructed and limited definition of “cyber-attacks.” This 
serves as a prelude to an analysis of what portion of cyber-attacks are governed 
by the law of war and other existing bodies of law. 
A. Defining “Cyber-Attack” 
For well over a decade, analysts have speculated about the potential 
consequences of a cyber-attack. The scenarios—ranging from a virus that 
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scrambles financial records or incapacitates the stock market,10 to a false 
message that causes a nuclear reactor to shut off11 or a dam to open,12 to a 
blackout of the air traffic control system that results in airplane crashes13—
anticipate severe and widespread economic or physical damage. While none of 
these scenarios has thus far occurred, numerous cyber-incidents occur 
regularly.14 Nevertheless, there is no settled definition for identifying these 
incidents as cyber-attacks,15 much less as cyber-warfare. The absence of a 
shared definition has made it difficult for analysts from different countries to 
develop coordinated policy recommendations and for governments to engage in 
coordinated action. Hence the technical project of defining cyber-attack is an 
important first step toward addressing the growing threat posed by cyber-
attacks. After describing some existing definitions, we offer a definition that 
effectively encompasses the activity that lies at the heart of the concerns raised 
by cyber-attacks.16 
1. Existing Conceptions of Cyber-Attack 
Existing definitions of “cyber-attack” and related terms vary widely. 
Perhaps one of the most widely cited definitions comes from government 
security expert Richard A. Clarke, who defines cyber-war as “actions by a 
nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the 
purposes of causing damage or disruption.”17 Similarly, former NSA and CIA 
director Michael Hayden has spoken of cyber-war as the “deliberate attempt to 
disable or destroy another country’s computer networks.”18 These definitions, 
however, do not distinguish between a cyber-crime, cyber-attack, and cyber-
war.19 As a result, they are open to a dangerously broad application of the war 
framework in the cyber context.20 In addition, Clarke’s definition is too narrow 
10. Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1042 (2007). 
11. Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations: Looking for 
Law in All the Wrong Places?, 51 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 140 (2005). 
12. Barton Gellman, Cyber Attacks by al Qaeda Feared; Terrorists at Threshold of Using 
Internet as Tool of Bloodshed, Experts Say, WASH. POST, June 27, 2002, at A1. 
13. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL: WEAK COMPUTER SECURITY 
PRACTICES JEOPARDIZE FLIGHT SAFETY (May 1998). 
14. See, e.g., infra Part I.B (providing recent examples of cyber-attacks). 
15. As distinct from cyber-crime. See infra Part I.B. 
16. In Part IV of this Article, we explore methods by which the U.S. government and other 
governments can adopt the proposed definition or a similar, uniform definition. 
17. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 7, at 6; see, e.g., More Than Firewalls: Three Challenges 
to American Cyber Security, ASYMMETRIC THREAT (Aug. 2011), http://asymmetricthreat.net/docs/ 
snapshot2011_08.pdf (citing Clarke’s definition); Understanding Cyber Warfare, supra note 7. 
18. Tom Gjelten, Extending the Law of War to Cyberspace, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 22, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130023318 (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).  
19. See infra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the importance and mechanics of distinguishing 
between the concepts of cyber-attack and cyber-crime. 
20. See infra Part II.A for a detailed exploration of jus ad bellum as it applies to cyber-attacks.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134932 
02-Hathaway (Do Not Delete) 7/6/2012 12:47:17 AM 
824 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:817 
 
in one respect: it limits the definition to attacks perpetrated by nation-states, 
thereby excluding entirely plausible scenarios in which attacks are carried out 
by non–state actors.  
Technical experts have proposed more limited definitions. For example, in 
his famous and prescient 1995 work on information warfare, Martin Libicki 
limits cyber-warfare to semantic attacks—digital assaults that cause systems to 
seem to operate normally, when in fact they generate “answers at variance with 
reality.”21 This approach excludes the broad range of potential threats to a 
country’s national security that target cyber-infrastructure but do not meet the 
requirements of a semantic attack. These threats have the same capacity to 
inflict harm on computer systems or networks, and thus any definition of cyber-
attack that excludes them is necessarily incomplete. 
There have been two particularly prominent government-led efforts to 
understand the scope of the threat posed by cyber-attacks, one by the U.S. 
government and the other by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—a 
security cooperation group composed of China, Russia, and most of the former 
Soviet Central Asian republics, as well as observers including Iran, India, and 
Pakistan. Perhaps not surprisingly, they have arrived at very different 
understandings of the problem. 
Shortly after establishing the United States Cyber Command, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff published a lexicon in 2011 for military use in cyber-operations, 
which included the first official military definition of cyber-attack. It defines a 
cyber-attack as: 
A hostile act using computer or related networks or systems, and 
intended to disrupt and/or destroy an adversary’s critical cyber 
systems, assets, or functions. The intended effects of cyber attack are 
not necessarily limited to the targeted computer systems or data 
themselves—for instance, attacks on computer systems which are 
intended to degrade or destroy infrastructure or C2 capability. A cyber 
attack may use intermediate delivery vehicles including peripheral 
devices, electronic transmitters, embedded code, or human operators. 
The activation or effect of a cyber attack may be widely separated 
temporally and geographically from the delivery.22 
A key feature of this approach is that it limits “cyber-attacks” to those hostile 
acts that are intended to harm critical cyber systems—thus restricting the 
definition based on the objective of the attack.23 
21. MARTIN C. LIBICKI, WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE? 77 (1995). 
22. Gen. James E. Cartwright, Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Servs., Commanders of 
the Combatant Commands, Dirs. of the Joint Staff Directories on Joint Terminology for Cyberspace 
Operations 5 (Nov. 2011). 
23. Alternative views of cyber-attack and cyber-warfare preceded this announcement in policy 
circles in the United States. In 2001, the Congressional Research Service defined cyber-warfare as 
“warfare waged in cyberspace. It can include defending information and computer networks, deterring 
information attacks, as well as denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. It can include offensive 
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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, by contrast, has adopted a more 
expansive means-based approach to cyber-attacks. The Organization has 
“express[ed] concern about the threats posed by possible use of [new 
information and communication] technologies and means for the purposes [sic] 
incompatible with ensuring international security and stability in both civil and 
military spheres.”24 It defines an “information war” as “mass psychologic[al] 
brainwashing to destabilize society and state, as well as to force the state to 
take decisions in the interest of an opposing party.”25 Moreover, it identifies the 
dissemination of information harmful to “social and political, social and 
economic systems, as well as spiritual, moral and cultural spheres of other 
states” as one of the main threats to information security.26 
Hence the Shanghai Cooperation Organization appears to have adopted an 
expansive vision of cyber-attacks that includes the use of cyber-technology to 
undermine political stability. Commentators fear that this definition represents 
an effort to justify censorship of political speech on the Internet.27 This concern 
is particularly salient in light of recent government efforts to suppress political 
organizing using new media in Iran, Egypt, and elsewhere.28As the Internet is 
increasingly utilized as a forum for exchange of ideas and political 
organization, such suppression threatens human rights. 
information operations mounted against an adversary, or even dominating information on the 
battlefield.” STEVEN A. HILDRETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: 
CYBERWARFARE 16 (2001). In 2009, the U.S. National Research Council, an independent organization 
in Washington, D.C., defined cyber-attack as “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or 
destroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting 
these systems or networks.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS 
REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 1 (William A. Owens et al. 
eds., 2009) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].  
24. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE SHANGHAI 
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION 
SECURITY, 61ST PLENARY MEETING (Dec. 2, 2008) [hereinafter SHANGHAI COOPERATION 
AGREEMENT]. The distinction between this interpretation and that of the United States is 
understandable in light of Matthew Waxman’s analysis of strategic differences in the cyber-attack 
context. As Waxman notes, “major state actors in this area are likely to have different views on legal 
line drawing because they perceive a different set of strategic risks and opportunities.” Matthew C. 
Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 
421, 458–59 (2011). 
25. SHANGHAI COOPERATION AGREEMENT, Annex I, at 209. 
26. Id. at 203. 
27. See, e.g., Tom Gjelten, Seeing the Internet as an ‘Information Weapon,’ NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130052701; see also 
infra Part I.A.2.e. 
28. See, e.g., Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Iran Clamps Down on Internet Use, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 
2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/05/iran-clamps-down-internet-use; Matt Richtel, 
Egypt Halts Most Internet and Cell Service, and Scale of Shutdown Surprises Experts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 29, 2011, at A13; Sal Gentile, Gadhafi Regime “Turns Off the Tap” on Libya’s Internet, Live 
Blog: Libya Revolts, PBS (Mar. 4, 2011, 6:46 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/the-daily-
need/libya-revolts-a-live-blog/7679/.  
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The distance between these two government-led understandings of cyber-
attacks demonstrates the importance of specifying a clear definition of the 
problem to be faced. The next Subsection takes on this task. 
2. Recommended Definition 
In this Article, we adopt a narrow definition of cyber-attack, one meant to 
focus attention on the unique threat posed by cyber-technologies: 
A cyber-attack consists of any action taken to undermine the functions 
of a computer network for a political or national security purpose. 
This Subsection discusses each aspect of this definition to explain the reasoning 
behind the language and to clarify which activities it encompasses. 
a. “A cyber-attack . . .” 
Implicit in this term is the requirement that the conduct must be active: 
either offense or active defense.29 Active defense includes “electronic 
countermeasures designed to strike attacking computer systems and shut down 
cyber-attacks midstream.”30 Governments are likely to employ both active and 
passive defenses—and the two are often designed to work in tandem31—but the 
passive defense cannot on its own amount to a cyber-attack.32 
b. “. . . consists of any action taken . . .” 
A cyber-attack may be carried out by means of any action—hacking, 
bombing, cutting, infecting, and so forth—but to be a cyber-attack it must aim 
to undermine or disrupt the function of a computer network. In this respect, this 
Article adopts the U.S. objective-based approach rather than the means-based 
approach of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
Warfare may be classified on the basis of the means of attack. For 
example, warfare may be classified as kinetic (conventional, physical) warfare, 
biological warfare, chemical warfare, nuclear warfare, intelligence-based 
warfare, network-based warfare,33 or guerilla warfare. Warfare may also be 
29. Measures of passive defense against cyber-attacks, such as virus scanning software or 
firewalls, are outside the scope of this definition.  
30. JEFFREY CARR, INSIDE CYBER WARFARE 46 (2010).  
31. Active defense may be triggered by passive activities. For example, a routine virus scan 
that identifies a virus and then eliminates it switches from passive (scanning) to active (elimination). 
32. The U.S. government currently utilizes both active and passive defenses. See U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE (2011) [hereinafter 
DOD STRATEGY]. 
33. This is distinct from “network warfare,” which is defined as “the employment of Computer 
Network Operations (CNO) with the intent of denying adversaries the effective use of their computers, 
information systems, and networks, while ensuring the effective use of our own computers, 
information systems, and networks.” NRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 165. Network-based warfare is 
any type of warfare that utilizes networks. Note a similar distinction between intelligence-based 
warfare (which describes the means) and information warfare (which describes the objective).  
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defined by its objective. “Objective” here means the direct target, rather than 
the long-range purpose, of the action. Examples include information warfare, 
psychological warfare, command and control warfare,34 electronic warfare, and 
economic warfare. 
Because we define cyber-attack according to its objective (“to undermine 
the functions of a computer network for a political or national security 
purpose”), any means may be used to accomplish a cyber-attack. Defining 
cyber-attack by objective rather than means is superior for three reasons. 
First, and most important, this type of definition is simply more intuitive. 
Using a computer network in Nevada to operate a predator drone for a kinetic 
attack in Pakistan is not a cyber-attack; rather, it is technologically advanced 
conventional warfare. Using a regular explosive to sever the undersea network 
cables that carry the information packets between continents, on the other hand, 
is a cyber-attack.35 This view is consistent with that offered by the U.S. 
Department of Defense, which has identified kinetic attack as a strategy in 
cyber-offensive operations.36 
Second, the objective-based approach is logical. Warfare traditionally 
functions in four domains—land, air, sea, and space—each of which is 
addressed by one of the full-time armed services.37 With the rise of cyber-
warfare, strategists have identified a fifth domain: cyberspace.38 In response, 
the United States has created the U.S. Cyber Command, a subdivision of the 
joint services Strategic Command.39 Although the Cyber Command is not a 
34. “Command and control warfare” includes any attack meant to interfere with the enemy’s 
capacity to command and control its troops. See GEORGE J. STEIN, INFORMATION ATTACK: 
INFORMATION WARFARE IN 2025, at 2 (1996), available at http://csat.au.af.mil/2025/volume3/vol3 
ch03.pdf. The Department of Defense defines command and control as 
[t]he exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned 
and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions 
are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, 
and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.  
Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
35. See Antolin-Jenkins, supra note 11, at 138 (“[K]inetic weapons are certainly part of the 
cyberwar arsenal.”). 
36. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL 
MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 15 (2006). A National Research Council report 
on “cyber offensive operations” excluded kinetic attacks on computer networks for the purposes of the 
report, but acknowledged that such attacks were realistic forms of cyber-attack. NRC REPORT, supra 
note 23, at 12–19. 
37. Space is difficult to assign to the Army, Navy, or Air Force, but its proper classification is 
outside the scope of this paper. 
38. See DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 5; War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST (July 1, 
2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16478792. The Joint Chiefs of Staff identify cyberspace as 
one of the “global commons,” along with international waters, air space, and space. JOINT CHIEFS OF 
STAFF, NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (2004). 
39. William H. McMichael, DoD Cyber Command Is Officially Online, ARMYTIMES (May 
22, 2010, 9:20 AM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/05/military_cyber_command_052110/; 
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unique service, it coordinates the functional operations of the Army, Navy (and 
Marines), and Air Force. The armed services are traditionally organized by 
domain rather than by platform. The Army’s function is to control land, not to 
drive tanks and fire land-based artillery; the Navy’s function is to control the 
seas, not to operate boats and ships; and the Air Force’s function is to control 
the skies, not to fly planes and drop bombs. Each service has access to 
whatever tools and weapons it deems necessary to control its domain: planes, 
boats, missiles, artillery, computer networks, and so forth. By the same logic, 
Cyber Command’s mission is not to utilize computer networks for any 
objective, but to defend the ability to operate in cyberspace by any means.40 
Third, an objective-based approach avoids unnecessarily limiting Internet 
speech, thereby avoiding the serious risks posed by a means-based definition. 
By encompassing any activity that uses cyber-technology and jeopardizes 
stability, a means-based understanding of cyber-warfare can be used to 
constrain the expression of free speech and political dissent online.41 The 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s definition may have been designed to be 
means-based in part for this reason.42 
c. “. . . to undermine the function . . .” 
The objective of a cyber-attack must be to undermine the function of a 
computer network. A computer network may be compromised in many 
different ways. Syntactic attacks disrupt a computer’s operating system, 
causing the network to malfunction.43 Examples include “worms, viruses, [and] 
Trojan horses.”44 The incident in Burma, discussed in the opening to this 
Article, constituted a syntactic attack. In contrast, semantic attacks preserve the 
operating system but compromise the accuracy of the information it processes 
and to which it reacts.45 As a result, “[a] system under semantic attack operates 
and will be perceived as operating correctly, . . . but it will generate answers at 
variance with reality.”46 The Stuxnet attack described above was, in part, a 
semantic attack because the nuclear plant appeared to be operating normally 
even as it was malfunctioning.47  
see Thom Shanker, Cyberwar Chief Calls for Secure Computer Network, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, 
at A1. 
40. See DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 5 (“[T]reating cyberspace as a domain is a critical 
organizing concept for DoD’s national security missions. This allows DoD to organize, train, and 
equip for cyberspace as we do in air, land, maritime, and space to support national security interests.”). 
41. See Gjelten, supra note 27.  
42. See id.; SHANGHAI COOPERATION AGREEMENT, supra note 24. 
43. Antolin-Jenkins, supra note 11, at 139. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 140. 
46. LIBICKI, supra note 21, at 77. 
47. Cyber-attacks need not be limited to syntactic or semantic attacks. The U.S. cyber-
operation in Iraq discussed below, for example, was neither syntactic nor semantic. Nevertheless, it 
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By contrast, neither cyber-espionage nor cyber-exploitation constitutes a 
cyber-attack because these concepts do not involve altering computer networks 
in a way that affects their current or future ability to function.48 For example, in 
2003, a security breach created numerous leaks of sensitive information from 
U.S. Department of Defense computers, which occurred over several months.49 
The Department has acknowledged that the majority of such incidents—
collectively referred to as “Titan Rain”—were orchestrated by China as a 
method of cyber-espionage.50 Another recent example of cyber-espionage 
occurred when hackers operating from China copied data from Google and 
other major Internet technology companies in 2010. The alleged purpose of the 
prolonged security breach ranged from theft of intellectual property to unlawful 
surveillance of human rights activists.51 Subsequent developments imply that at 
least one purpose of the attack—dubbed “Operation Aurora”—was to monitor 
U.S. government officials’ emails.52 More recently, the Department of Defense 
admitted that it suffered one of its worst cyber-espionage leaks in March 2011, 
when foreign hackers gained access to over 24,000 Pentagon files.53 
Meanwhile, the extent to which the United States is conducting similar 
activities is unknown.54 
constitutes a cyber-attack under this Article’s definition, as it did “undermine the function” of the 
secure email system by causing it to send an email from an unauthorized user.  
48. This Article adopts the following definition of cyber-espionage: “[T]he science of covertly 
capturing e-mail traffic, text messages, other electronic communications, and corporate data for the 
purpose of gathering national-security or commercial intelligence.” Seymour M. Hersh, The Online 
Threat: Should We Be Worried About a Cyber War? NEW YORKER (Nov. 1, 2010), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/11/01/101101fa_fact_hersh?. The former director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) emphasizes that cyber-espionage does not fall under the umbrella 
of cyber-warfare, likely because the U.S. government—like many other governments—routinely 
engages in espionage over communications networks. Gjelten, supra note 18. Notably, the National 
Research Council draws a similar line. It distinguishes what it calls cyber-exploitation—which 
includes actions that merely gather information from the cyber-domain and is therefore related to, if 
perhaps somewhat broader than, cyber-espionage—from cyber-attack because “[t]he [law of armed 
conflict] presumes that a clear distinction can be drawn between the use of force and espionage, where 
espionage is avowedly not a use of force.” NRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 22, § 1.6.  
49. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BOTNETS, CYBERCRIME, AND 
CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 14 (2008). 
50. Id. 
51. A New Approach to China, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 3:00 PM), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html; see also James Glanz & John 
Markoff, State’s Secrets Day 7; Vast Hacking by a China Fearful of the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 
2010, at A1. 
52. See, e.g., Amir Efrati & Siobhan Gorman, Google Mail Hack Is Blamed on China, WALL 
ST. J., June 2, 2011, at A1; Wyatt Andrews, China Google Hacker’s Goal: Spying on U.S. Govt, CBS 
NEWS (June 2, 2011), http://m.cbsnews.com/fullstory.rbml?catid=20068474&feed_id=0& 
videofeed=36 (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
53. Thom Shanker & Elisabeth Bumiller, After Suffering Damaging Cyberattack, the 
Pentagon Takes Defensive Action, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, at A6. 
54. See Jack Goldsmith, What Is the Government’s Strategy for the Cyber-Exploitation 
Threat?, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 10, 2011, 10:58 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/08/what-is-
the-government%E2%80%99s-strategy-for-the-cyber-exploitation-threat/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
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Although all of these incidents of cyber-espionage compromised the 
security of a computer network for the purpose of carrying out a military 
objective,55 they did not “undermine the function” of a computer system and 
thus were not cyber-attacks as defined here. To “undermine the function” of a 
computer system, an actor must do more than passively observe a computer 
network or copy data, even if that observation is clandestine. The actor must 
affect the operation of the system either by damaging the operating system or 
by adding false, misleading, or unwelcome information. Such activities may be 
criminal—as acts of corporate or political cyber-espionage—but they are not 
cyber-attacks. In this respect, our definition reflects a common distinction 
between espionage and attacks in more traditional settings. 
d. “. . . of a computer network . . .” 
A cyber-attack must target a computer network, where a computer 
network is defined as a system of computers and devices connected by 
communications channels. Frequently, this connection exists over the Internet, 
but there are also numerous closed networks, such as the secure networks 
employed by agencies of the U.S. government. 
It is important to bear in mind that computers are now everywhere. The 
concept of a computer encompasses more than a simple desktop or laptop; it 
also includes the devices that control elevators and traffic lights, regulate 
pressure on water mains, and are ubiquitous in appliances such as cell phones, 
televisions, and even washing machines.56 The potential for widespread 
damage from a cyber-attack grows in tandem with the spread of computers to 
nearly every facet of human activity. 
e. “. . . for a political or national security purpose.” 
A political or national security purpose distinguishes cyber-attack from 
simple cyber-crime. Any aggressive action taken by a state actor in the cyber-
domain necessarily implicates national security and is therefore a cyber-attack 
(where the action satisfies all the other elements of the definition), whether or 
not it rises to the level of cyber-warfare. A cyber-crime committed by a non–
state actor for a political or national security purpose is a cyber-attack. On the 
other hand, a cyber-crime that is not carried out for a political or national 
security purpose, such as most instances of Internet fraud, identity theft, and 
intellectual property piracy, does not fit this final element of a “cyber-attack” 
and is therefore mere cyber-crime. 
55. See Michael Joseph Gross, Enter the Cyber-Dragon, VANITY FAIR, Sept. 2011, available 
at http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/09/chinese-hacking-201109 (detailing these and 
other successful hacks of public and private systems). 
56. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 7, at 70–74. 
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There are at least two important reasons for excluding nonpolitical cyber-
crimes (that is, cyber-crimes not carried out for a political or national security 
purpose) from the definition of cyber-attack. First, such activities, while 
troubling, do not raise the same legal questions as activities that might breach 
public international law. The actions of the Kremlin Kids, private hackers who 
allegedly shut down the Georgian Internet during Russia’s invasion of South 
Ossetia,57 invoke legal doctrines surrounding state responsibility and 
terrorism58 in a way that the actions of Onel de Guzman, a student who was 
suspected of infecting tens of millions of computers in 2000 with the 
destructive but undirected “love bug virus,”59 do not. Second, a cleaner 
delineation between cyber-attacks that present threats to national security and 
purely private cyber-crime will clarify ownership of cyber-security needs 
among various government departments. 
A political or national security purpose also denotes the public nature of 
the cyber-attacks without limiting the definition to state actors. This is 
important because, due to their low cost and the relative invulnerability of non–
state actors to in-kind retribution, cyber-attacks are a particularly attractive 
weapon for terrorists and other non–state actors.60 Because non–state actors 
may execute or may be the victim of cyber-attacks, the purpose, rather than the 
actor, must distinguish a cyber-attack from a simple cyber-crime. This 
definition does not distinguish between state and non–state actors. Rather, it 
identifies a legal framework that is compatible with existing law of war and 
international law distinctions between non–state and state actors. 
Although this distinction is notable, it is not without risks. There is always 
a danger that cyber-regulations may be applied against individuals using 
technology for legitimate political dissent, which necessarily has a political 
purpose. While the First Amendment protects dissent in the United States, the 
use of cyberspace regulations to suppress dissent is a serious possibility in 
57. See Noah Shachtman, Kremlin Kids: We Launched the Estonian Cyber War, WIRED (Mar. 
11, 2009, 12:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/03/pro-kremlin-gro/ (last visited Apr. 
19, 2012); infra Part I.B.1. 
58. The line drawn between simple cyber-crime and cyber-attack by private individuals is 
analogous to the line drawn between violent crime and terrorism. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(B) (2006) 
(defining international terrorism according to its apparent political intentions); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1611 (9th ed. 2009) (defining terrorism as using violence “as a means of affecting 
political conduct”). 
59. Mark Landler, A Filipino Linked to ‘Love Bug’ Talks About His License to Hack, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at C1. 
60. See NRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 20, §1.4 (on low cost); id. at 41 (on limited 
applicability of deterrence by threat of in-kind response); DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 3 
(discussing the power of small groups to cause significant harm due to the low barriers to entry for 
cyber-activity); Shanker & Bumiller, supra note 53 (noting that while most major efforts to penetrate 
military computer networks are still orchestrated by large rival nations, the technical expertise is 
certain to migrate to rogue states and non–state actors). 
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countries that do not have the same liberal democratic traditions.61 Internet 
regulations in China are a troubling testament to this fact.62 As a foreign policy 
matter, the United States must ensure that any proposed domestic legislation 
(which may serve as a model for other countries) or international regime 
(which may be susceptible to multiple readings) clearly maintains online space 
for legitimate dissent while strengthening the legal tools to combat and punish 
cyber-attacks.63 This definition seeks to keep legitimate dissent out of the 
category of cyber-attack by specifying that a cyber-attack’s objective must be 
to undermine the function of a computer network. It would not include, for 
example, computer-based efforts to organize political protests. 
The definition offered here adopts the objective-based approach taken by 
the U.S. government, but it adds a “purpose” requirement that enables policy-
makers to distinguish between mere cyber-crime and cyber-attacks. Such a 
distinction is crucial to domestic and international efforts to implement cyber-
security, because it more effectively tailors the legal approach to the threat 
posed and focuses resources on true national security threats. 
3. Cyber-Attack, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Warfare Compared 
We summarize our definition of “cyber-attack” and the distinctions 






61. See, e.g., Gjelten, supra note 27 (on Chinese and Russian efforts to control communication 
on the Internet). 
62. China has also been embroiled in cyber-conflict with private entities as well—namely, 
Google and Yahoo. Since the early 2000s, the U.S.-based companies have been criticized for their 
cooperation with the Chinese government, both in policing internal dissidents and in censoring 
external information of a political nature. See Yahoo ‘Helped Jail China Writer,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 7, 
2005, 8:18 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4221538.stm; Google Censors Itself for China, BBC 
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2006, 8:45 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4645596.stm. Pressure from 
the Chinese government for such cooperation comes in response to activity it labels as “cyber-
attacks”—the dissemination of information that undermines civil and military stability. See SHANGHAI 
COOPERATION AGREEMENT, supra note 24. 
63. The White House’s recent strategy paper on cyberspace addresses the danger that efforts to 
reduce cyber-attacks could stifle free speech. It notes that “the ability to seek, receive, and impart 
information and ideas through any medium and regardless of frontiers has never been more relevant” 
and urges that “exceptions to free speech in cyberspace must also be narrowly tailored.” OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND 
OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 5 (2011) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY]. 
Protecting fundamental freedoms and privacy is one of the White House’s seven high-level policy 
priorities for cyberspace, id. at 23–24, and one of the three law enforcement policy priorities is to 
“[f]ocus cybercrime laws on combating illegal activities, not restricting access to the internet,” id. at 
20.  
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TABLE 1: Essential characteristics of different cyber-actions 







Involves only non–state actors  √  
Must be violation of criminal law, committed 
by means of a computer system 
 √  
Objective must be to undermine the function 
of a computer network 
√  √ 
Must have a political or national security 
purpose 
√  √ 
Effects must be equivalent to an “armed 
attack,” or activity must occur in the 
context of armed conflict 
  √ 
 





















In order to understand cyber-attack, it is important to appreciate the 
distinctions between cyber-attack and cyber-crime. Cyber-crime is a broad 
concept analytically distinct from cyber-attack. While, as with the concept of 
cyber-attack, there is no universally recognized definition of cyber-crime,64 
 
64. See, e.g., Sarah Gordon & Richard Ford, On the Definition and Classification of 
Cybercrime, 2 J. COMPUTER VIROLOGY 13, 13 (2006) (“Despite the fact that the word ‘Cybercrime’ 
has entered into common usage, many people would find it hard to define the term precisely.”); Sylvia 
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there are aspects of cyber-crime that are broadly recognized. In particular, 
cyber-crime is generally understood as the use of a computer-based means to 
commit an illegal act. One typical definition describes cyber-crime as “any 
crime that is facilitated or committed using a computer, network, or hardware 
device.”65 Cyber-crime, unlike the definition of cyber-attack proposed in this 
Article, is thus often defined by its means—that is, a computer system or 
network. As such, cyber-crime encompasses a very broad range of illicit 
activity. Among the priorities of the Department of Justice and FBI units 
addressing cyber-crime are fraudulent practices on the Internet, online piracy, 
storage and sharing of child pornography on a computer, and computer 
intrusions.66 Unlike cyber-attacks, cyber-crimes need not undermine the target 
computer network (though in some cases they may do so), and most do not 
have a political or national security purpose. Finally, like all crimes, but unlike 
cyber-attacks, cyber-crimes are generally understood to be committed by 
individuals, not states.67 While the distinction between cyber-crime and cyber-
attack is important, we acknowledge that it often will not be readily apparent at 
the moment of the cyber-event whether it is one or the other (or both)—in part 
because the identity and purpose of the actor may not be apparent. Such 
uncertainty counsels in favor of an immediate response that would be 
appropriate to either cyber-crime or a cyber-attack.  
Most cyber-crimes do not also constitute cyber-attack or cyber-warfare, as 
depicted in Figure 1. An act is only a cyber-crime when a non–state actor 
commits an act that is criminalized under domestic or international law. 
Mercado Kierkegaard, International Cybercrime Convention, IGI GLOBAL, http://www.igi-
global.com/viewtitlesample.aspx?id=7486 (last visited Apr. 6, 2012) (“[T]here is still no accepted 
definition of what really constitutes cybercrime.”); see also DEBRA LITTLEJOHN SHINDER, SCENE OF 
THE CYBERCRIME: COMPUTER FORENSICS HANDBOOK 16 (Ed Tittel ed., 2002) (“[T]he definition of 
computer crime under state law differs, depending on the state.”). 
65. Gordon & Ford, supra note 64, at 14. In addition, some proposed definitions are broad 
enough to include not only all crimes committed by means of a computer, but also any crime in any 
way involving a computer as a means or a target. See, e.g., SHINDER, supra note 64, at 17 (referring to 
the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders’ broad 
definition of “computer-related crime,” as compared to its narrower, means-based definition of 
“computer crime”).  
66. See generally COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, CRIMINAL 
DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES (2d ed. 2010); Cyber Crime, 
FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). The Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime, similarly, covers a broad range of criminal activity committed by means 
of a computer, including “action directed against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
computer systems, networks and computer data as well as the misuse of such systems, networks and 
data.” Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, E.T.S. No. 185, pmbl., Nov. 23, 2001 (entered 
into force July 1, 2004), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm 
[hereinafter Cybercrime Convention]. 
67. Therefore, under our definition, while public officials may commit cyber-crimes while 
acting outside the scope of their authority, the actions of states, even if unlawful, are not considered to 
be crimes as such. 
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Consider the following three scenarios, each of which includes a cyber-crime 
that is not a cyber-attack:  
First, a non–state actor commits an illegal act for a political or national 
security purpose by means of a computer network but does not undermine that 
network. For example, an individual might commit a cyber-crime by expressing 
political dissent over the Internet where that dissent is illegal under domestic 
law. Similarly, an individual might commit a cyber-crime by hacking into a 
major bank’s records with a national security or political purpose but without 
undermining the bank’s system in the process. 
Second, a non–state actor commits an illegal act by means of a computer 
network—and undermines a computer network—but not for a political or 
national security purpose. Again consider the bank data hacker, who now 
manages to undermine the bank’s online account system but whose only 
purpose is economic gain. This, too, would constitute a cyber-crime, but not a 
cyber-attack or cyber-warfare. 
Third, a non–state actor is engaged in illicit activity using a computer or 
network but does not undermine the function of a computer network and does 
not operate with a political or national security purpose. A person who transfers 
child pornography, for example, would commit a cyber-crime but not a cyber-
attack, both because the actions do not undermine the function of a computer 
network and because he or she is not motivated by a political or national 
security purpose. 
As shown in Figure 1, just as some cyber-crimes are neither cyber-attacks 
nor cyber-warfare, some cyber-attacks are neither cyber-crimes nor cyber-
warfare. Two scenarios fall into this cyber-attack-only category. The first 
includes attacks carried out by a state actor, outside the context of an armed 
conflict, provided its effects do not rise to the level of an armed attack. An 
example is the attack by the Chinese government on the Falun Gong website in 
2011.68 Note that such attacks must still satisfy all elements of the cyber-attack 
definition, including undermining the function of a computer network for a 
political or national security purpose. As noted above, however, any act by a 
state actor automatically satisfies the political or national security purpose 
requirement. 
The second cyber-attack-only scenario includes attacks by non–state 
actors that do not rise to the level of an armed attack and which do not 
constitute a cyber-crime, either because they have not been criminalized under 
national or international law or because they do not use computer-based means. 
Practically speaking, it is unlikely for a private actor to purposefully69 
undermine the function of a computer network without also violating the law, 
68. See Nakashima & Wan, supra note 5. 
69. Because a cyber-attack must be “for a political or national security purpose,” the only 
actions falling into this category would be purposeful. 
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but such gaps in the criminal law are conceptually possible. It is furthermore 
worth noting that a large majority of cyber-attacks would likely involve 
computer-based means, though such means are not necessary to cyber-attack 
under the definition proposed here. 
While cyber-activity may constitute only cyber-crime or only cyber-
attack, a substantial proportion of cyber-crimes are also cyber-attacks. The 
overlapping area between cyber-crime and cyber-attack seen in Figure 1 occurs 
when a non–state actor commits an illegal act by means of a computer network, 
undermines a computer network, and has a political or national security 
purpose. The consequences of this act would not rise to the level of an armed 
attack, or the activity would also constitute cyber-warfare. Note also that a state 
committing this very same act would not fall within this overlap, since only a 
non–state actor can commit a cyber-crime. Take, for example, a hypothetical 
group of individuals who hacked into the U.S. State Department’s server and 
shut it down out of disdain for the U.S. government. This instance would fall 
within the overlap between cyber-crimes and cyber-attacks given that a non–
state actor committed the act, for a political or national security purpose, and it 
undermined a computer network. 
Cyber-warfare is distinctive among the three cyber-categories considered 
here in that cyber-warfare must also constitute a cyber-attack. The overlapping 
area between cyber-attack and cyber-warfare (but not cyber-crimes) in Figure 1 
includes two types of attacks. The first type includes attacks carried out by any 
actor in the context of an armed conflict, provided those actions could not be 
considered cyber-crimes, either because they do not constitute war crimes, or 
do not employ computer-based means, or both. The second type includes 
attacks carried out by a state actor, which produce effects equivalent to those of 
a conventional armed attack. Note that this use of force may be either lawful or 
unlawful; because the actor is a state actor, even unlawful actions do not 
necessarily constitute “cyber-crime.” 
Cyber-warfare can also constitute both cyber-attack and cyber-crime. The 
area of intersection between all three circles in Figure 1 includes two types of 
attacks carried out by a non–state actor. First, it includes attacks in the context 
of an existing armed conflict that undermine the function of a computer 
network for a political or national security purpose, violate the criminal law 
(for example, war crimes), and were committed by means of a computer system 
or network. Second, it includes attacks that produce effects equivalent to those 
of a conventional armed attack, undermine the function of a computer network 
for a political or national security purpose, and are violations of the criminal 
law committed by means of a computer system or network. 
As summarized in Table 1 and Figure 1, then, a cyber-attack may be 
carried out by state or non–state actors, must involve active conduct, must aim 
to undermine the function of a computer network, and must have a political or 
national security purpose. Some cyber-attacks are also cyber-crimes, but not all 
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cyber-crimes are cyber-attacks. Cyber-warfare, on the other hand, always meets 
the conditions of a cyber-attack. But not all cyber-attacks are cyber-warfare. 
Only cyber-attacks with effects equivalent to those of a conventional “armed 
attack,” or occurring within the context of armed conflict, rise to the level of 
cyber-warfare. We say more about when this condition is met in Part II below. 
B. Recent Cyber-Attacks 
There are a variety of activities that fall within this Article’s definition of 
cyber-attacks. The following examples of recent cyber-incidents—though far 
from exhaustive—demonstrate the variety and scope of recent cyber-attacks. 
They also introduce the wide-ranging challenges to regulating such attacks. 
1. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks 
Distributed Denial of Service (“DDOS”) attacks have been the most 
prevalent form of cyber-attack in recent years. In these attacks, coordinated 
botnets—collections of thousands of “zombie” computers hijacked by insidious 
viruses—overwhelm servers by systematically visiting designated websites. 
The attack in Burma, described above, was a DDOS attack, as was the attack 
on a Falun Gong website inadvertently aired on China Central Television. 
There are several other recent examples of such attacks—a few of which we 
describe here to provide a sense of the varied ways in which such attacks may 
be carried out. 
After controversially moving a Soviet-era war memorial in April 2007, 
the densely wired70 Republic of Estonia suffered a DDOS attack. Such attacks 
often cause mere inconvenience, but this one nearly had life threatening 
consequences—the emergency line to call for an ambulance or a fire truck was 
out of service for an hour.71 Allegedly executed by networks of hackers,72 
authorities never officially attributed the attack to a state, but some suspect 
Russia’s involvement due to the sophistication and scale of the attack.73 
A similar fate befell Georgia in the summer of 2008, when the country 
found itself unable to communicate with the outside world over the Internet as 
Russian forces invaded South Ossetia.74 Despite early speculation that the 
70. Estonia has one of the highest network saturation rates in the world. CLARKE & KNAKE, 
supra note 7, at 13. 
71. Newly Nasty: Defences Against Cyberwarfare Are Still Rudimentary. That’s Scary, 
ECONOMIST (May 24, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/9228757?story_id=9228757 (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
72. Specifically, a youth movement (funded by the Russian government) later claimed 
responsibility for the attack. Shachtman, supra note 57. 
73. Jeffrey T. G. Kelsey, Note, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles 
of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1429 (2008). 
74. The Threat from the Internet: Cyberwar: It Is Time for Countries to Start Talking About 
Arms Control on the Internet, ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16481504 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
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Russian government had planned the incident, it now appears likely that the 
government simply stood by as private hackers openly orchestrated the attack.75 
Russians are certainly not the only source of DDOS attacks. In July 2009, 
a number of government and commercial websites in the United States and 
South Korea were shut down by a DDOS attack. Although South Korea quickly 
blamed North Korea,76 the United States was more circumspect.77 There remain 
some questions about where the attack originated. This serves to illustrate a 
common problem for cyber-attacks in general and DDOS attacks in particular: 
by enlisting unsuspecting computers from around the world, botnets spin a web 
of anonymity around the attacker or attackers, making accurate attribution 
uniquely difficult. 
2. Planting Inaccurate Information 
Another form of cyber-attack is a semantic attack, in which the attacker 
surreptitiously inputs inaccurate information in a computer system. More 
sophisticated than the DDOS attack, a semantic attack causes the computer 
system to appear to operate normally, even as it fails.78 
In 1999, for example, the United States developed a plan to feed false 
target data into the Serbian air defense command network, inhibiting Serbia’s 
ability to target NATO aircraft.79 This attack would have exploited the 
increasing reliance on computer networks that characterizes modern warfare. In 
the end, NATO forces abandoned the plan due to legal concerns about 
collateral damage.80 
The Israeli Air Force employed a similar strategy on September 6, 2007 
during its air strike against a nuclear facility in Syria. Israeli planes arrived 
undetected at their targets because of an earlier cyber-attack that compromised 
the Syrian air-defense system. The exact method of attack is unknown, but 
Israel apparently fed false messages to the radars, causing them to show clear 
skies on the night of the strike.81 
Because these cyber-attacks frequently accompany and facilitate 
conventional attacks, attribution is less problematic. The difficulty here is in 
75. Brian Krebs, Report: Russian Hacker Forums Fueled Georgia Cyber Attacks, WASH. 
POST SECURITY FIX BLOG (Oct. 16, 2008, 3:15 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/ 
2008/10/report_russian_hacker_forums_f.html. 
76. Malcolm Moore, North Korea Blamed for Cyber Attack on South Korea, TELEGRAPH 
(July 8, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ asia/southkorea/5778176/North-Korea-
blamed-for-cyber-attack-on-South-Korea.html. 
77. Officials anonymously leaked qualified reports of U.S. suspicions that the attack emerged 
in North Korea. U.S. Eyes N. Korea for ‘Massive’ Cyber Attacks, MSNBC.COM (July 9, 2009, 3:31 
AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31789294/ns/technology_and_science-security. 
78. LIBICKI, supra note 21, at 77. 
79. William M. Arkin, The Cyber Bomb in Yugoslavia, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 1999), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/dotmil/arkin.htm. 
80. Kelsey, supra note 73, at 1434–35. 
81. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 7, at 1–9. 
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identifying when a cyber-attack has occurred, since the disruption remains 
hidden until its kinetic sequel. 
3. Infiltrating a Secure Computer Network 
Once an attacker infiltrates a secure computer network she can execute a 
variety of actions.82 For example, the Stuxnet attack, in addition to being a 
semantic attack, targeted the secure computer networks at Iranian nuclear 
facilities for the purpose of disrupting the function of the nuclear facility. 
Such an attack does not always destroy the computer network or the 
infrastructure it controls. In 2003, shortly before the invasion of Iraq, the 
United States infiltrated the Iraqi Defense Ministry email system to contact 
Iraqi officers with instructions for a peaceful surrender. The messages 
apparently worked: American troops encountered abandoned military 
equipment arranged in accordance with the email.83 This cyber-attack was a 
“Command and Control Attack”—a term that includes any attack meant to 
interfere with the enemy’s capacity to command and control its troops. 
These incidents demonstrate that attacks need not arrive over the Internet, 
but may instead involve infiltrating separate, secure networks. These networks 
may include not only desktops and laptops, but the ubiquitous and unseen 
computing systems, such as industrial control systems, that facilitate modern 
life. Together, these examples also illustrate the growing number of cyber-
attacks and the diversity of their forms and scope that make the project of 
crafting a legal approach to them all the more challenging. The next Part 
examines when a cyber-attack rises to the level of “cyber-warfare” governed by 
the law of war—and when and how that law allows states to respond to such 
attacks. 
II. 
LAW OF WAR AND “CYBER-WARFARE” 
Although the term “cyber-warfare” has become part of common parlance, 
few have aimed to examine closely the scope of cyber-activity that might be 
governed by the law of war. In this Part, we aim to fill this gap by examining 
when a cyber-attack constitutes an armed attack under jus ad bellum and thus 
can be accurately considered “cyber-warfare.” We also examine how the laws 
governing conduct in the course of war—known as jus in bello—might apply to 
cyber-attacks. We do not attempt a detailed application of jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello to cyber-attacks, because such inquiries are intensely fact specific. 
Instead, we lay out the general types of cyber-attacks that would be governed 
82. For reasons explained above, cyber-espionage—stealing rather than planting 
information—is not included in most definitions of cyber-attack. See supra text accompanying notes 
43–46. 
83. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 7, at 9–10. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134932 
02-Hathaway (Do Not Delete) 7/6/2012 12:47:17 AM 
840 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:817 
 
by the law of war and note how an attack’s cyber-based nature complicates the 
traditional law of war analysis. We conclude that while the law of war provides 
useful guidelines for addressing some of the most dangerous forms of cyber-
attack, the law of war framework ultimately addresses only a small slice of the 
full range of cyber-attacks.84 Cyber-warfare is only a part of a much larger 
problem. 
It is worth noting at the outset that applying the existing law of war 
framework to cyber-attacks is extraordinarily challenging. The key treaties 
governing conduct in war, the Geneva Conventions, were last revised in the 
wake of World War II. Nothing was further from the minds of the drafters of 
the Geneva Conventions than attacks carried out over a worldwide computer 
network. One unanticipated challenge is how to address attacks that have little 
or no direct physical consequences, but that nonetheless cause real harm to 
national security. Perhaps for this reason, thus far no state has claimed that a 
cyber-attack constitutes an “armed attack” giving rise to a right of self-defense 
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Nor has any state argued that cyber-
attacks generally constitute a prohibited use of force. The fact that such attacks 
are increasing in number and scope, however, suggests that there is a growing 
need for states to reach a consensus as to when a cyber-attack constitutes an 
armed attack or use of force. In the absence of agreement, the increase in 
attacks heightens the possibility that states might respond to a cyber-attack with 
conventional military means.85 The rise in attacks also creates a more pressing 
need for a more comprehensive legal framework to regulate activities—such as 
those causing widespread economic damage—that would not be governed by 
the law of war.86 
84. Practitioners and scholars are divided on how easily the law of war can be applied to 
cyber-attacks. The Handbook guiding Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard operations, discussing 
information operations, states that “[l]egal analysis of intended wartime targets requires traditional law 
of war analysis.” DEP’T OF THE NAVY, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS, § 8.11.1 (2007) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. Some scholars argue that 
“[t]he law of war targeting principles of military necessity, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering 
govern all uses of force, whatever means employed.” Sean Watts, Combatant Status and Computer 
Network Attack, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 391, 425 (2010); see also Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: 
Computer Network Attack and the Jus in Bello, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 195 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002) (arguing that 
existing norms remain intact, although a computer network attack offers new means to target 
nonmilitary objectives); Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences from Knock-On Effects: A 
Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1145 (2003) 
(arguing that no new legal framework is necessary).  
85. This is not mere speculation. The Department of Defense issued a report in late 2011 in 
which it declared that the United States reserves the right to respond to cyber-attacks using “all 
necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.” DEP’T OF DEFENSE, 
CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, SECTION 934, at 2 (2011).  
86. Others argue that the law of war as it currently stands is insufficient and in need of revision 
in light of cyber-attacks. See Hollis, supra note 10, at 1027–28; Davis Brown, A Proposal for an 
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We turn first to the most vital question under jus ad bellum—when would 
a cyber-attack rise to the level of an armed attack justifying self-defense under 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter? As indicated in Table 1 above, we conclude that 
the best test of when a cyber-attack is properly considered cyber-warfare is 
whether the attack results in physical destruction—sometimes called a “kinetic 
effect”—comparable to a conventional attack. Arriving at this conclusion 
requires examining not only the Charter’s text—which is quite general and 
vague—but also the meaning given to that text by state practice and 
interpretation over time. Because an armed conflict has never begun solely as a 
result of a cyber-attack, there is no state practice on what cyber-attacks justify 
an armed response. Accordingly, the legal analysis here is necessarily 
speculative. 
We turn next to applying the law of war once armed conflict has 
commenced, or jus in bello, to cyber-warfare. This body of law is less 
speculative, as there have been documented incidents of cyber-attacks in the 
context of an armed conflict. Even so, it is challenging to apply even widely 
accepted core jus in bello principles of proportionality and distinction to cyber-
warfare. These challenges illustrate the importance of commencing an 
international dialogue on these issues to bring clarity to existing law of war 
principles in this context. They also demonstrate that the law of war alone 
cannot address the new challenges posed by cyber-attacks. 
A. Jus ad Bellum 
What law governs states’ right to resort to armed force in self-defense 
against cyber-attacks? To answer this question, we proceed in three steps. First, 
we outline the general prohibition on the use or threat of force in international 
relations contained in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Second, we discuss the 
exceptions to that prohibition for collective security operations and self-
defense, paying particular attention to when a cyber-attack would justify resort 
to self-defense. Finally, we close by explaining the customary international law 
requirements of jus ad bellum necessity and proportionality and by detailing the 
limitations and problems of applying jus ad bellum requirements to cyber-
attacks. We conclude that states may only use defensive armed force in 
response to a cyber-attack if the effects of the attack are equivalent to those of a 
conventional armed attack. 
1. Governing Legal Principles: Prohibition on Use of Force and Intervention in 
Internal Affairs 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that member states “shall refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 179 (2006). 
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territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”87 This 
prohibition is complemented by a customary international law norm of 
nonintervention, which prohibits states from interfering in the internal affairs of 
other states.88 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has held that, where 
the interference takes the form of a use or threat of force, the customary 
international law norm of nonintervention is coterminous with Article 2(4).89 
The precise scope of the international prohibition on the threat or use of 
force has been the subject of intense international and scholarly debate. Weaker 
states and some scholars have argued that Article 2(4) broadly prohibits not 
only the use of armed force, but also political and economic coercion. 
Nonetheless, the consensus is that Article 2(4) prohibits only armed force.90 
Discussions about cyber-attacks have the potential to reignite debates over 
the scope of Article 2(4).91 Because it is much less costly to mount cyber-
attacks than to launch conventional attacks, and because highly industrialized 
states are generally more dependent upon computer networks and are more 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks, cyber-attacks may prove to be a powerful weapon 
of the weak. This change in the cost structure of offensive capabilities may both 
increase the likelihood of cyber-attacks and change the political valence of 
different interpretations of Article 2(4)’s scope. Stronger states may begin to 
favor more expansive readings of Article 2(4) that prohibit coercive activities 
like cyber-attacks.92  
87. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
88. See G.A. Res. 37/10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/10 (Nov. 15, 1982); G.A. Res. 25/2625, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
89. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, para. 209 (June 27) (“[A]cts constituting a breach of the customary principle of nonintervention 
will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of 
non-use of force in international relations.”). It is possible, however, that to the extent cyber-attacks do 
not constitute a use of force, they may nevertheless violate the customary international law norm of 
nonintervention, as discussed below. 
90. Daniel B. Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4) of the 
United Nations Charter, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 73, 80–82 
(Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002). The principal arguments for the prevailing 
view are: (1) that Article 2(4) was conceived against a background of efforts to limit unilateral 
recourse to armed force, not economic and political coercion; (2) that the travaux preparatoires show 
that the San Francisco Conference rejected a proposal that would have extended Article 2(4) to include 
economic sanctions; and (3) that the ICJ has held that financing armed insurrection does not constitute 
force, indicating that other economic measures that are even less directly related to armed violence 
would not constitute prohibited force either. Id. at 81. There remains some ambiguity, however, as to 
the extent to which Article 2(4) prohibits nonmilitary physical force, such as flooding, forest fires, or 
pollution. Id. at 82–83. 
91. See Waxman, supra note 24. 
92. Walter Sharp has advocated that the United States make precisely this kind of strategic 
interpretive move, arguing that a broad array of coercive cyber-activities should fall within Article 
2(4)’s prohibition. WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 129–33 (1999). 
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Cyber-attacks may also violate the customary international law norm of 
nonintervention, as defined by a growing record of state practice and opinion 
juris. First, states generally do not engage in cyber-attacks openly, but rather try 
to hide their responsibility by camouflaging attacks through technical means93 
and by perpetrating the attacks through non–state actors with ambiguous 
relationships to state agencies.94 As Thomas Franck has observed, “[l]ying 
about facts . . . is the tribute scofflaw governments pay to international legal 
obligations they violate.”95 In other words, the very fact that states attempt to 
hide their cyber-attacks may betray a concern that such attacks may constitute 
unlawful uses of force. Second, when states acknowledge that they have been 
victims of cyber-attack, they and their allies tend to denounce and condemn the 
attacks.96 Third, in its common approach to cyber-defense, NATO has indicated 
that cyber-attacks trigger states parties’ obligations under Article 4 of the 
NATO treaty,97 which applies only when “the territorial integrity, political 
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”98 The invocation 
of this provision strongly suggests that NATO member states believe that 
cyber-attacks violate the customary norm of nonintervention or a related 
international law norm.99 Still, as the next Subsection explains, the fact that a 
cyber-attack is unlawful does not necessarily mean that armed force can be 
used in response. 
2. Exceptions for Collective Security and Self-Defense 
Article 2(4)’s blanket prohibition on the nonconsensual use or threat of 
force is subject to two exceptions: actions taken as part of collective security 
operations and actions taken in self-defense. 
The first exception falls under Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. Article 39 
empowers the Security Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and [to] make 
93. See Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A 
Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 
MIL. L. REV., Fall 2009, at 1, 74–75. 
94. See, e.g., CARR, supra note 30, at 29 (“Hacking attacks cloaked in nationalism are not only 
not prosecuted by Russian authorities, but they are encouraged through their proxies, the Russian 
youth associations, and the Foundation for Effective Policy.”). 
95. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy After Kosovo and Iraq, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
USE OF FORCE AT THE TURN OF CENTURIES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF V.D. DEGAN 69, 73 (Vesna 
Crnić-Grotić & Miomir Matulović eds., 2005). 
96. See, e.g., Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia, 
GUARDIAN (May 16, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia 
(detailing the reactions by Estonian, EU, and NATO officials to a cyber-attack on Estonia). 
97. NATO Agrees Common Approach to Cyber Defence, EURACTIV.COM (Apr. 4, 2008), 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/infosociety/nato-agrees-common-approach-cyber-defence/article-171377. 
98. North Atlantic Treaty, art. 4, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
99. As noted below, however, NATO does not believe that cyber-attacks rise to the level of 
armed attacks justifying self defense. See NATO Agrees Common Approach to Cyber Defence, supra 
note 97; infra Part II.A.2. 
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recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”100 The Security Council may employ 
“measures not involving the use of armed force”101 and authorize “action by 
air, sea, or land forces.”102 Collective security operations under Article 39 can 
be politically difficult, however, because they require authorization by the often 
deadlocked or slow-moving Security Council.  
The second exception to Article 2(4) is codified in Article 51, which 
provides that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.”103 Lawful self-
defense can be harder to define and identify than lawful collective security 
operations. Indeed, in many armed conflicts, both sides claim to be acting in 
self-defense, and the international debates tend to focus on factual and political 
disputes rather than legal doctrine.104 It is clear, however, that the critical 
question determining the lawfulness of self-defense is whether or not an armed 
attack has occurred. A cyber-attack must rise to the level of an armed attack for 
a state to respond lawfully under Article 51.105 
The term “armed attack” is linguistically distinct from several other 
related terms in the U.N. Charter and has been interpreted to be substantively 
narrower than them.106 For example, there may be acts that violate Article 
2(4)’s prohibition on the use or threat of force that do not rise to the level of an 
armed attack, and hence do not trigger the right of self-defense under Article 
51. The ICJ has indicated that cross-border incursions that are minor in their 
“scale and effects” may be classified as mere “frontier incident[s]” rather than 
“armed attacks.”107 Instead, to qualify as armed attacks sufficient to justify a 
100. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
101. Id. art. 41. 
102. Id. art. 42. 
103. Id. art. 51. For example, the White House’s recent cyberspace strategy paper includes the 
right of self-defense as one of the norms that should guide conduct in cyberspace. WHITE HOUSE 
CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 10. 
104. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 95–96 (2d ed. 2004). 
105. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 14 (“When 
warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat 
to our country. All states possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain hostile 
acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments we have with our 
military treaty partners.”). 
106. See Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, in COMPUTER 
NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 99, 100–01 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. 
O’Donnell eds., 2002). 
107. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, ¶ 195 (June 27); cf. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 29/3314, Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression] (determining that “[t]he first 
use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of 
an act of aggression although the Security Council may . . . conclude that a determination that an act of 
aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, 
including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity” (emphasis 
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response under Article 51, attacks must constitute “most grave forms of the use 
of force.”108 Where they may not resort to defensive force under Article 51 
(because an attack does not rise to the level of an “armed attack”), states may 
be permitted to respond with retorsions or nonforceful countermeasures within 
carefully proscribed legal limits.109 As described in more detail in Part III.A, 
such countermeasures might include responses in cyberspace.110 
In scholarly debates over the application of jus ad bellum to cyber-attacks, 
three leading views have emerged to determine when a cyber-attack constitutes 
an armed attack that triggers the right of armed self-defense: the instrument-
based approach, the target-based approach, and our preferred approach: the 
effects-based approach.111  
One scholar has given the moniker “instrument-based” to the classical 
approach to the armed attack inquiry.112 Under this view, a cyber-attack alone 
will almost never constitute an armed attack for purposes of Article 51 
“because it lacks the physical characteristics traditionally associated with 
military coercion”—in other words, because it generally does not use 
traditional military weapons.113 This approach treats a cyber-attack as an armed 
added)). Scholars generally agree that there is a gap between the prohibition on the use of force and the 
right of self-defense. See, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 106, at 99, 100–01. 
108. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
14, ¶ 191 (June 27). 
109. Retorsions are lawful unfriendly acts made in response to an international law violation 
by another state; countermeasures are acts that would be unlawful if not done in response to a prior 
international law violation. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), at 31, 80 [hereinafter Draft Articles]. See infra Part III.A for a more 
detailed discussion of countermeasures. 
110. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS (1999), reprinted in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 459, 484–85 [hereinafter DOD MEMO] (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. 
O’Donnell eds., 2002) (“If the provocation is not considered to be an armed attack, a similar response 
will also presumably not be considered to be an armed attack.”). 
111. Once a state has been the victim of an armed attack, a further question arises as to against 
whom the state can respond. Where the armed attack is perpetrated by a state, this question is easily 
answered—self-defense may be directed against the perpetrating state. However, cyber-attacks may be 
perpetrated by non–state actors or by actors with unclear affiliations with state security agencies. 
Although some scholars argue that cyber-attacks (and conventional attacks) must be attributable to a 
perpetrating state in order for the victim state to take defensive action that breaches another state’s 
territory, others—drawing on traditional jurisprudence on self-defense—argue that states possess the 
right to engage in self-defense directly against non–state actors if certain conditions are met. See 
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones 
in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237, 238–39 (2010) (“The vast majority of writers agree 
that an armed attack by a non-state actor on a state, its embassies, its military, or other nationals abroad 
can trigger the right of self-defense addressed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, even if 
selective responsive force directed against a non-state actor occurs within a foreign country.”). 
112. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International 
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 909 (1999); see also 
Hollis, supra note 10, at 1041.  
113. Hollis, supra note 10, at 1041. 
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attack only if it uses military weapons. Bombing computer servers or Internet 
cables could meet the requirements of an armed attack, for example, if the 
strike was of sufficient gravity. 
The text of the U.N. Charter provides some support for the instrument-
based approach, since Article 41 characterizes the “complete or partial 
interruption of . . . telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication” as a 
“measure[] not involving the use of armed force.”114 The U.N. General 
Assembly’s Definition of Aggression also implicitly supports the instrument-
based view: it lists a number of acts that would constitute “aggression” under 
Article 39—a broader category than armed attack under Article 51—and all of 
them involve military weapons or force.115 NATO has also signaled its 
agreement with this view; its new common approach to cyber-defense 
establishes that a cyber-attack will obligate member states to “consult” with 
one another under Article 4 of the NATO treaty, but a cyber-attack will not 
constitute an armed attack that obligates member states to assist one another 
under Article 5 of the treaty.116 
The chief advantage of the instrument-based approach is simplicity of 
application, since uses of military weapons and force are relatively easy to 
identify. However, because cyber-attacks have the potential to cause 
catastrophic harm without employing traditional military weapons, most 
scholars have rejected the instrument-based approach to defining armed attacks 
as dangerously outdated. 
Recognizing the fundamental inability of the instrument-based approach 
to account for harms not caused by conventional means, the target-based 
approach classifies as an armed attack any cyber-attack that targets a 
sufficiently important computer system.117 The primary aim of this approach is 
to determine when a cyber-attack portends imminent harm sufficient to justify 
the use of anticipatory self-defense in response.118 
While the target-based approach has the benefit of allowing for aggressive 
protection of critical national systems, it broadly sanctions forceful self-
defense, increasing the likelihood that cyber-conflicts will escalate into more 
114. U.N. Charter art. 41. 
115. See Definition of Aggression, supra note 107, art. 3. 
116. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 98, arts. 4, 5, 63; NATO Agrees Common Approach to 
Cyber Defence, supra note 97. 
117. Walter Sharp, the leading proponent of this approach, argues that a cyber-attack 
constitutes an armed attack, and would grant the target the right to use force in self-defense whenever 
it penetrates any critical national infrastructure system, regardless of whether it has yet caused any 
physical destruction or casualties. SHARP, supra note 92, at 129–30; see also Sean M. Condron, 
Getting it Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
403, 415-16 (2007) (advocating a similar approach); Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical 
National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 
208–09 (2002) (same). 
118. Hollis, supra note 10, at 1041 n.73. 
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destructive conventional armed conflicts.119 A cyber-attack need only penetrate 
a critical system to justify a conventional military response that could start a 
physical, kinetic war. This approach could undermine the security of the 
international community by making war much more likely. 
Finally, the effects-based approach classifies a cyber-attack as an armed 
attack based on the gravity of its effects. Steering a middle course between the 
instrument- and target-based views, the effects-based approach is the most 
promising and most widely accepted approach. Different versions of the 
effects-based approach may measure that gravity by reference to any of a 
variety of factors, from the sheer severity of the harm to the length of the causal 
chain between the cyber-attack itself and the ultimate harm. But all versions of 
this approach share a common orientation towards the inquiry. 
The problem with the effects-based approach, however, lies in articulating 
ex ante what types of effects justify self-defense.120 Consider, for example, an 
attack on an air traffic control system, an attack that disables a regional 
electrical power grid, an attack on the New York Stock Exchange or national 
financial networks, or the 2007 cyber-attack on prominent Estonian websites. 
Which of these cyber-attacks, if any, have effects large enough to be considered 
armed attacks justifying the use of defensive force in response? All of these 
attacks may cause small- or large-scale civilian deaths and infrastructure 
damage, but it would be difficult for the aggressor country to predict the 
outcome of any individual attack. Different versions of the effects-based 
approach may reach different conclusions for each of these examples. 
Professor Michael Schmitt, the best-known proponent of the effects-based 
approach for determining when a cyber-attack should be considered an armed 
attack, argues that a cyber-attack’s effects should be measured by reference to 
six factors: (1) severity: the type and scale of the harm; (2) immediacy: how 
quickly the harm materializes after the attack; (3) directness: the length of the 
causal chain between the attack and the harm; (4) invasiveness: the degree to 
which the attack penetrates the victim state’s territory; (5) measurability: the 
degree to which the harm can be quantified; and (6) presumptive legitimacy: 
the weight given to the fact that, in the field of cyber-activities as a whole, 
cyber-attacks constituting an armed attack are the exception rather than the 
rule.121 These factors are illuminating, but they call for such a wide-ranging 
119. See Sklerov, supra note 93, at 56 n.352 (criticizing the target-based approach for 
encouraging escalation and advocating an effects-based approach). 
120. This difficulty is aggravated by the reality that the “indirect effects” of cyber-attacks are 
often “more consequential” than the immediate ones. NRC REPORT, supra note 23, at 19. 
121. Schmitt, supra note 112, at 914–15; see also Sean P. Kanuck, Recent Development: 
Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272, 290 
(1996) (“Each suspect activity could be reviewed for its effects on other states, and sanctioned 
accordingly.”). 
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inquiry that they may not provide sufficient guidance to decision makers.122 In 
other words, different analysts applying this version of the effects-based 
approach might plausibly classify all or none of the examples listed above as 
armed attacks. 
Daniel Silver, former General Counsel of the CIA and National Security 
Agency, argues instead that the key criterion determining when a cyber-attack 
constitutes an armed attack is the severity of the harm caused. A cyber-attack 
justifies self-defense “only if its foreseeable consequence is to cause physical 
injury or property damage and, even then, only if the severity of those 
foreseeable consequences resembles the consequences that are associated with 
armed coercion.”123 Under this test, a cyber-attack on the air traffic control 
system causing planes to crash would be regarded as an armed attack because it 
is foreseeable that such an attack would cause loss of life and substantial 
property damage. But a cyber-attack on a website or mere penetration of a 
critical computer system generally would not, unless it caused physical injury 
or property damage. A cyber-attack on financial systems presents a harder case 
for this approach—the analysis would depend on whether the attack was found 
to have caused substantial damage to property. 
It is important to note that the purpose of the attack is already accounted 
for in the definition of cyber-attack recommended herein: the attack must have 
been committed for a political or national security purpose. Therefore a cyber-
attack that has unforeseen national security consequences would not be 
considered a cyber-attack, much less cyber-warfare. 
This final version of the effects-based approach provides the best balance 
between enabling states to adequately respond to catastrophic cyber-attacks and 
preventing states from resorting to armed force too easily. The test defines a 
small core of harmful cyber-attacks that rise to the level of an armed attack.124 
It also focuses the armed attack analysis on a limited set of criteria—
particularly severity and foreseeability.125 
122. See Silver, supra note 90, at 89 (claiming that “examination of [Schmitt’s] criteria 
suggests that virtually any event of [computer network attack] can be argued to fall on the armed force 
side of the line”); see also Jason Barkham, Information Warfare and International Law on the Use of 
Force, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 57, 85–86 (2001) (criticizing Schmitt’s use of presumptive 
legitimacy as a criterion, as well as Schmitt’s assumption that policy makers will be able to engage in a 
thorough factual inquiry when responding to cyber-attacks). 
123. Silver, supra note 90, at 90–91. 
124. See id. at 92. 
125. The Department of Defense has signaled its approval of this approach. See DOD MEMO, 
supra note 110, at 483 (arguing “the consequences are likely to be more important than the means 
used,” and providing examples of cyber-attacks that would cause civilian deaths and property 
damage). 
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3. Ad Bellum Necessity and Proportionality 
A state’s use of armed force in response to a cyber-attack must not only 
conform with U.N. Charter and customary international law limits on the use of 
armed force, but it must also comply with the jus ad bellum principles of 
necessity and proportionality under customary international law. The principle 
of necessity requires that force must be used only as a last resort, when 
peaceful means, such as a diplomatic settlement, cannot achieve the state’s 
overall aim.126 Proportionality extends this logic, prohibiting force if the overall 
scope and intensity of force is excessive in relation to the state’s actual or 
imminent danger.127 The United States has acknowledged that these principles 
apply to military responses to cyber-attacks.128 
While principles of necessity and proportionality are clear, applying those 
principles to state responses to cyber-attacks is challenging. Evaluating whether 
an invocation of self-defense complies with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality is difficult and fact intensive even for conventional attacks, and 
cyber-attacks present hard new questions. For example, cyber-attacks rising to 
the level of armed attacks may require decision makers to devise ways of 
measuring harm to computer networks and its indirect effects against more 
conventional kinds of harm in order to determine what would constitute a 
lawful response. 
Applying the existing jus ad bellum framework in the context of cyber-
attacks is challenging. Moreover, the framework only applies to the small 
subset of cyber-attacks that are addressed by Security Council resolutions or 
that constitute an armed attack, giving rise to a right of self-defense under 
Article 51. As a result, only a small number of cyber-attacks are properly 
considered “cyber-warfare,” to which the laws of war apply. Part III of this 
Article explores other international legal regimes that may help to regulate 
cyber-attacks that do not fall within these narrow boundaries. First, however, 
the following Section describes the legal framework governing cyber-attacks 
during an ongoing armed conflict. 
126. See, e.g., R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89 
(1938) (quoting Secretary of State Daniel Webster’s letter to his British counterpart concerning the 
Caroline incident as follows: “It must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on 
board the Caroline was impracticable, or would have been unavailing . . . but that there was a 
necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking her . . . .”). 
127. See Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum 
and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 108–09 (2009) (“Ad 
bellum proportionality is . . . parasitic on ad bellum necessity. . . . An act is ad bellum disproportionate 
if the same ad bellum objective sought by force clearly could have been achieved by diplomacy or 
another nonviolent strategy at a roughly comparable, or even moderately greater, cost.”). 
128. See WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 14 (“[W]e will exhaust all 
options before military force whenever we can; will carefully weigh the costs and risks of action 
against the costs of inaction; and will act in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our 
legitimacy, seeking broad international support whenever possible.”). 
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B. Jus in Bello 
Although a stand-alone cyber-attack has never instigated an armed 
conflict, cyber-attacks have been used in wars in response to traditional 
provocations or to prepare the way for an imminent conventional attack. This 
Section examines the relationship between traditional jus in bello requirements 
and cyber-attacks employed in the course of conventional armed conflicts. The 
novel conditions of cyberspace can pose challenges to applying jus in bello 
principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and neutrality. Because 
cyber-attacks are often not immediately lethal or destructive and may cause 
only temporary incapacity of network systems, it may be hard to evaluate 
whether a cyber-attack is proportional. It can also be difficult to distinguish 
between combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities, civilians 
engaged in a continuous combat function, and protected civilians in the context 
of cyber-attacks. Finally, the ease of masking the source of a cyber-attack 
makes enforcement of neutrality duties complicated and expensive. We briefly 
address each challenge in turn. 
1. In Bello Necessity 
Although the necessity of a cyber-attack may be difficult to evaluate, this 
difficulty arises from line-drawing debates that did not originate in cyber-
warfare and are not unique to in bello cyber-attacks. In bello necessity relates to 
the concrete military advantage to be gained from a specific hostile act. An 
individual cyber-attack may be unnecessary if it does not advance the military’s 
objective.129 While cyber-attacks must be necessary to be lawful, evaluating 
their in bello necessity does not present novel challenges. 
2. In Bello Proportionality 
The in bello proportionality requirement prohibits “[a]n attack which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”130 To 
129. In contrast, the ad bellum necessity analysis helps determine if nonforcible measures to 
abate a threat are inadequate, excusing an otherwise unlawful use of force. 
130. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), art. 51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol Additional I]; see also id. art. 85(3)(b). An indiscriminate attack, 
defined by excessive effect, is not to be confused with an attack that does not discriminate amongst 
civilian and military objectives, which is defined by objective, and is prohibited by article 85(3)(a). See 
infra Part II.B.3. Some scholars argue that, given the ability to avoid civilian casualties or damage to 
property and achieve the same military advantage, a state must do so. See DIMITRIOS DELIBASIS, THE 
RIGHT TO NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE IN INFORMATION WARFARE OPERATIONS 268 (2007) (arguing 
that the “unmatched accuracy” of information warfare “practically nullifies the element of chance 
embodied in all military entanglements”); Dakota S. Rudesill, Precision War and Responsibility: 
Transformational Military Technology and the Duty of Care Under the Laws of War, 32 YALE J. INT’L 
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conduct a jus in bello proportionality analysis, a military decision maker must 
weigh potential civilian casualties, destruction of civilian property, and the loss 
of indispensable civilian items against the benefit of achieving a military 
objective.131  
Due to the nature of harm they inflict, the proportionality of cyber-attacks 
poses unique challenges. It can be difficult to evaluate whether an attack would 
be proportional according to the relevant categories of “loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,” as the 
typical direct effects of cyber-attacks may be nonlethal or temporary, yet 
severe.132 In particular, how should the temporary incapacity of critical systems 
be evaluated?133 A cyber-attack that effectively stops the transmission of 
information through the Internet might merely inconvenience the populace, but 
it might also have more severe consequences. For example, it might cause 
hospitals to be unable to communicate vital information, leading to loss of life. 
An ex ante in bello proportionality analysis for a DDOS attack may therefore 
carry a much greater degree of uncertainty than would a conventional attack. 
An in bello proportionality analysis requires anticipating the probable 
consequences of an action, but additional uncertainty will make that analysis 
much more difficult in the cyber context. As a result, cyber-attacks may change 
the weight given to temporary consequences, and may force states to confront 
more uncertainty than they typically face in making decisions about the legality 
of planned attacks. 
3. Distinction 
The principle of distinction—which requires states to distinguish civilian 
and military personnel and restrict attacks to military objectives134—presents 
L. 517, 535 (2007) (arguing that the United States might be held to heightened standard of care due to 
advances in military technology). 
131. Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, arts. 51(5)(b), 54, 57(2)(a)(iii). After deciding that 
the target is a military objective, the elements of the balancing test include “target selection, the means 
and methods chosen for the military strike, the lack of negligence in the execution of the military 
strike, and the determination of what constitutes the military advantage of a particular military strike.” 
Randy W. Stone, Protecting Civilians During Operation Allied Force: The Enduring Importance of 
the Proportional Response and NATO’s Use of Armed Force in Kosovo, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 501, 
522 (2001). 
132. Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).  
133. Similar questions arise in debates around nonlethal deployments of biological and 
chemical weapons, such as riot agents. See James D. Fry, Gas Smells Awful: U.N. Forces, Riot-
Control Agents, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 475 (2010); Mirko 
Sossai, Drugs as Weapons: Disarmament Treaties Facing the Advances in Biochemistry and Non-
Lethal Weapons Technology, 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 5 (2010).  
134. Louise Doswald-Beck, Some Thoughts on Computer Network Attack and the 
International Law of Armed Conflict, in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
163, 166 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002). Distinction also imposes 
responsibilities on combatants to identify themselves in order to facilitate distinction on the battlefield 
and to receive the protections that are due to combatants. See Watts, supra note 84, at 438–39. States 
also have a duty to facilitate distinction: “The application of this duty requires that personnel and 
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another legal challenge.135 Under this principle, military commanders must 
employ weapons that can target accurately and must use this capability to 
distinguish between civilian and military objectives.136 By extension, the law of 
war prohibits in bello cyber-attacks that are uncontrollable, unpredictable, or do 
not discriminate between civilian and military objectives.137 Furthermore, 
Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks that deny the civilian population 
indispensable objects, such as food or water supplies.138 
There are situations where the principle of distinction is easily applied to 
cyber-attacks. For example, a cyber-attack that targets a military air traffic 
control system and only causes a troop transport to crash would comply with 
the principle of distinction.139 Other cyber-attacks would clearly violate the 
principle of distinction—for example, an attack on the civilian banking sector 
or on hospitals, museums, or places of worship.140 Cyber-attacks against the 
networks that manage these targets, like any other attack on these objects, 
would be unlawful.141 
Such cases are easy, but cyberspace offers many much more difficult 
ones. The distinction analysis will often be complicated in the context of a 
cyber-attack because the likely targets are used by a multiplicity of actors at 
once. Ninety-five percent of military communications use civilian networks at 
some stage,142 so it is possible that civilian networks could be attractive 
military targets.143 Because much of cyberspace is dual use—used by both the 
equipment directly engaged in information warfare be located in facilities whose attack by kinetic 
weapons would not result in excessive collateral damage.” Brown, supra note 86, at 192. 
135. See DELIBASIS, supra note 130, at 274 (arguing that information warfare will likely run 
afoul of distinction and proportionality); Kelsey, supra note 73, at 1431 (arguing that cyber-attacks 
will often violate the principles of distinction and neutrality). 
136. See Jensen, supra note 84, at 1154. The ICJ has found that nuclear weapons may violate 
international humanitarian law if they cannot be used in a manner that distinguishes between civilians 
and military objectives. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (Jul. 8). 
137. Military objectives are targets that meet two criteria: they serve a military purpose and 
their incapacitation conveys a definite advantage. Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, art. 52(2). For 
example, the first missile strikes of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 targeted Iraqi radar stations. 
Kanuck, supra note 121, at 282. On distinction, see Doswald-Beck, supra note 134, at 165–71; Brown, 
supra note 86, at 195 (comparing malicious code, which is indiscriminate, to biological weapons). 
Schmitt also argues that indiscriminate weapons are unlawful, including in that category not only 
cyber-attacks that cannot distinguish civilian and military objects, but also those which cannot be 
limited to a military objective. Schmitt, supra note 84, at 201 (citing Protocol Additional I, supra note 
130, art. 51(4)). 
138. Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, art. 54(2). 
139. Schmitt, supra note 84, at 196 (“Military equipment and facilities . . . are clearly military 
objectives.”).  
140. See, e.g., Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, art. 85(4)(d). 
141. Schmitt, supra note 84, at 200; Brown, supra note 86, at 199.  
142. Antolin-Jenkins, supra note 11, at 133. 
143. Jensen later argues that, given that military use of civilian infrastructure makes it a 
legitimate military target, the U.S. government has a duty to protect civilian networks from cyber-
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military and civilians—upholding the distinction requirement in cyberspace can 
be more challenging than it is in a conventional context. 
a. Who May Lawfully Be Targeted in a Cyber-Attack? 
Under the law of war, only three categories of individuals may be lawfully 
targeted: combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities, and civilians 
acting in a continuous combat function. Civilians lose their right not to be 
targeted to the extent that they “take a direct part in hostilities.”144 Furthermore, 
under customary international law affirmed by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, civilians who adopt a continuous combat function may also be 
targeted.145 These rules are familiar in the post-9/11 context. Yet the unique 
characteristics of civilian contributions to and participation in cyber-attacks 
threaten to blur the line between direct participation, continuous combat 
function, and other types of involvement in the execution of hostilities.146 
The civilian designer of a weapons system has traditionally not been 
treated as a direct participant in hostilities. However, the programmer who 
works with military intelligence may tweak the code to enable the attack, right 
up until the moment of the attack.147 The actions of such a civilian—
particularly of a civilian who regularly engages in such activity—could be 
considered a “continuous function [that] involves the preparation, execution, or 
command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in 
hostilities.”148 As a result, civilians involved in cyber-attacks might be regarded 
as performing tasks that alter their status under the law of war, rendering them 
lawful targets of a counterattack.149 
b. Who May Lawfully Carry Out a Cyber-Attack? 
In addition to the question of who may be targeted in a cyber-attack, the 
principle of distinction restricts how states constitute their cyber-fighting 
attacks. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 1533 (2010).  
144. Protocol Additional I, supra note 130, art. 51(3). 
145. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 16 (2009), available 
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0990.pdf [hereinafter ICRC, INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE]. 
146. See id. at 37 (noting the challenge that private contractors and civilian employees pose to 
the definition of direct participation due to “geographic and organizational closeness”). 
147. Watts, supra note 84, at 429. 
148. ICRC, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 145, at 34. 
149. Geoffrey S. Corn, Unarmed but How Dangerous? Civilian Augmentees, the Law of 
Armed Conflict, and the Search for a More Effective Test for Permissible Civilian Battlefield 
Functions, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 257, 286-87 (2008). Although the principle that a civilian who 
directly participates in hostilities or who adopts a continuous combat function may be lawfully 
attacked is not in dispute, the status of a civilian who provides indispensable, contemporaneous 
assistance in cyber-attacks remains unresolved. 
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forces.150 A state that sponsors use of force by civilians may be placing those 
civilians outside the protections they enjoy under the law of armed conflict, and 
may be undermining the principle of distinction between combatants and 
civilians.151 
Despite the legal consequences, there are many reasons to think states will 
be tempted to use civilians in the cyber context. First, civilians may possess 
technical expertise that governments do not. Second, by using civilians to carry 
out cyber-attacks, states can mask their own involvement in such operations.152 
For example, Nashi—a pro-Kremlin youth group started by Vladimir Putin—
has taken responsibility for the 2007 cyber-attacks against Estonia.153 It has 
been alleged that Russian business owners fund Nashi to carry out cyber-
attacks favored by the Russian government. The business owners “ingratiate 
themselves with the regime,” and the Russian government may plausibly deny 
involvement in the attack.154 
A former Special Assistant for Law of War Matters of the Judge Advocate 
General, Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey S. Corn, argues that the current direct 
participation test is outdated.155 He offers a new functional discretion test to 
determine who may carry out a cyber-attack based on whether “the exercise of 
discretion associated with this function [will] implicate [law of war] 
compliance.”156 Operating within a command relationship is the dispositive 
criterion for combatant status “because members of the armed forces are 
subject to responsible command, and they operate within a military hierarchy 
150. Watts, supra note 84, at 420. 
151. See DELIBASIS, supra note 130, at 281. The allocation of responsibilities for cyber-
warfare has been examined by the U.S. armed forces—the recently declassified Air Force cyberspace 
operations document explains that National Guard members may train for, but not carry out, cyber-
attacks. See U.S. AIR FORCE, CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS: AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 3-12, at 
29 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd3-12.pdf. Even though the United States 
has launched a new Cyber Command, the details of responsibility for defending against a cyber-attack 
are still being worked out. See Jim Garamone, Official Details DOD Cybersecurity Environment, AM. 
FORCES PRESS SERV. (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=61356 
(“Government and private officials are grappling with basics such as what constitutes a cyber attack 
and who has responsibility to defend against threats.”). The DoD strategy emphasizes partnering with 
the private sector to encourage innovation, incremental improvements, and workforce development, 
but says little about the nature of those collaborations. See DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 10–11. 
152. States that do so may not only deny those civilians the protections due to civilians under 
the laws of war, but may also be guilty of perfidy themselves. See Protocol Additional I, supra note 
130, art. 37. 
153. See Hollis, supra note 10, at 1024–25 (describing the attacks against Estonia); 
Shachtman, supra note 57. 
154. Shachtman, supra note 57. 
155. Cf. supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
156. Corn, supra note 149, at 287. Corn emphasizes the importance of distinction and law of 
war compliance, for regular forces and for paramilitaries. Id. at 264–65. This functional test is different 
from Schmitt’s consequences test, which focuses on whether the cyber-attack would cause foreseeable 
death, injury, or destruction. 
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involving training, discipline, and unitary loyalty.”157 Corn argues that only 
individuals subject to command authority should be able to exercise discretion 
that could result in a law of armed conflict violation, because the actions of 
those individuals are within a command and discipline structure that can 
prevent and punish violations.158 Under this reasoning, states may not employ 
civilian contractors to carry out activities where they will exercise discretion 
that implicates the law of armed conflict. 
4. Neutrality 
A final challenge in evaluating the legality of an in bello cyber-attack is 
the fact that a cyber-attack may appear to originate, or may actually originate, 
from a neutral state.159 A state may be neutral, either permanently, such as 
Switzerland, or for the duration of a specific conflict.160 The principle of 
neutrality includes both rights and responsibilities: “The principal right of the 
neutral nation is that of inviolability; its principal duties are those of abstention 
and impartiality. Conversely, it is the duty of a belligerent to respect the former 
and its right to insist upon the latter.”161 
Scholars hold differing views regarding neutral states’ obligations to 
guard against the use of their facilities by belligerents. Some argue that neutral 
states are not obligated to stop belligerents from using their communications 
facilities, but they may not help belligerents build such facilities.162 Others 
argue that neutral states that are unable or unwilling to stop an unlawful attack 
originating from their territory, including their information systems, may 
lawfully be targeted for the purpose of stopping the unlawful attack.163 They 
claim that states have an obligation not only to refrain from committing cyber-
attacks themselves, but also “not to allow knowingly [their] territory to be used 
for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”164  
157. Corn, supra note 149, at 287; see also Brown, supra note 86, at 191 (arguing that only 
armed forces should carry out cyber-attacks). But see SUSAN W. BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS: THE 
EMERGING FAULT LINES OF THE NATION STATE 199 (2009) (arguing that the rationale for excluding 
civilians was to protect them from retaliatory attack, but since civilian infrastructure is very likely to be 
attacked in cyber-warfare, this rationale for excluding civilians from combat is less persuasive). 
158. Corn, supra note 149, at 261.  
159. See BRENNER, supra note 157, at 131–32 (noting the difficulty of identifying attackers in 
the cyber-threat context); see also Brown, supra note 86, at 208 (on rights and responsibilities of 
neutrality). 
160. See George K. Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1079, 1141–42 (2000) (discussing neutrality and information warfare). 
161. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 84, ¶ 7.2 (noting also that “[t]his customary law 
has, to some extent, been modified by the Charter of the United Nations”). 
162. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 134, at 176. 
163. See DELIBASIS, supra note 130, at 284; COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 84, ¶ 
7.3. 
164. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania) (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). See, e.g., 
Sklerov, supra note 93, at 43. 
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Certain characteristics of cyber-attacks make the evaluation of the 
principle of neutrality unusually complex. Cyber-attacks may harness zombie 
computers located in one country to harm networks in another country—
without the knowledge of any individual, much less the government—by 
masking their origin through a series of servers and computers.165 Such cyber-
attacks pose challenges to analysis under the principle of neutrality for two 
reasons. First, a country may not know its computers are being used for a 
cyber-attack, and it therefore may not know its neutrality is threatened. Second, 
the principle of neutrality determines lawful responses to attacks based on the 
identity of the origin country. Consequently, the inability to attribute attacks to 
a certain state impedes the neutrality analysis.166 However, it is also possible 
that political uncertainty about lawful responses to cyber-attack may be 
masquerading as an inability to attribute attacks; further clarity around the legal 
framework governing cyber-attacks may reduce barriers to attribution. While 
the political problems of attribution might contribute to the apparent difficulties 
of attribution, the possibility remains that a country may not know attacks are 
emanating from its borders. 
The existing law of war framework—both jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello—provides some guidance, albeit incomplete and imperfect, for states 
seeking to determine the scope of permissible offensive and defensive cyber-
attacks. But it does not regulate the vast majority of cyber-attacks. Most cyber-
attacks do not rise to the level of an armed attack or take place in the context of 
an armed conflict. Consequently, they do not implicate the law of war. Yet this 
does not necessarily mean that these cyber-attacks are unregulated. As the next 
Part shows, there are a variety of other legal frameworks that fill some of the 
gaps left by the law of war framework. 
III. 
OTHER LEGAL FRAMEWORKS GOVERNING CYBER-ATTACKS 
There are several existing legal frameworks in addition to the law of war 
that explicitly or implicitly regulate cyber-attacks. We begin with what is 
potentially the most important such framework—the international law of 
countermeasures, which regulates how states may respond to international law 
violations that do not rise to the level of an armed attack justifying self-defense. 
Next, we outline the international legal regimes that directly regulate some 
elements of cyber-attacks. We then describe international legal regimes that 
indirectly govern some cyber-attacks by regulating the means through which 
those attacks are conducted. Finally, we examine U.S. domestic laws that could 
be used to address some cyber-attacks. 
165. Goldsmith, supra note 54, at 10–12. 
166. Shanker & Bumiller, supra note 53 (“Officials say the main challenge for the United 
States in a retaliatory cyberoperation is determining the attacker.”). 
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These other bodies of law offer victims of cyber-attacks useful tools for 
responding to attacks. Yet each individual tool has significant limits. Even 
taken together, the legal framework is piecemeal and incomplete. This should 
come as no surprise: much of the law that applies to cyber-attacks was not 
designed for this purpose. This Part sets the stage for reflections on legal 
reforms that would enable domestic and international law to more effectively 
regulate cyber-attacks. 
A. Countermeasures 
The customary international law of countermeasures governs how states 
may respond to international law violations that do not rise to the level of an 
armed attack justifying self-defense—including, implicitly, cyber-attacks. The 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility define countermeasures as “measures 
that would otherwise be contrary to the international obligations of an injured 
State vis-à-vis the responsible State, if they were not taken by the former in 
response to an internationally wrongful act by the latter in order to procure 
cessation and reparation.”167 
The international law of countermeasures does not define when a cyber-
attack is unlawful. Indeed, the Draft Articles do not directly address cyber-
attacks at all. The law simply provides that when a state commits an 
international law violation, an injured state may respond with a 
countermeasure.168 As explained above, some cyber-attacks that do not rise to 
the level of an armed attack nonetheless violate the customary international law 
norm of nonintervention.169 These violations of international law may entitle a 
harmed state to use countermeasures to bring the responsible state into 
compliance with the law. 
The Draft Articles lay out the basic customary international law principles 
regulating states’ resort to countermeasures.170 The Draft Articles provide that 
countermeasures must be targeted at the state responsible for the prior wrongful 
act and must be temporary and instrumentally directed to induce the 
responsible state to cease its violation.171 Accordingly, countermeasures cannot 
167. Draft Articles, supra note 109, at 128. Traditionally, these acts were termed “reprisals,” 
but this report follows the Draft Articles in using the more modern term “countermeasures.” Reprisals 
now predominantly refer to forceful belligerent reprisals. Id. 
168. States thus resort to countermeasures at their own risk. If the use of countermeasures does 
not comply with the applicable international legal requirements, the state may itself be responsible for 
an internationally wrongful act. Id. at 130. 
169. See supra Part II.A.1. 
170. Countermeasures are distinct from retorsions. Retorsions are acts that are unfriendly but 
lawful, such as limiting diplomatic relations or withdrawing from voluntary aid programs, and they 
always remain a lawful means for a State to respond to a cyber-attack or other international legal 
violation. 
171. Draft Articles, supra note 109, at 129. Accordingly, the law of countermeasures does not 
specify how states may respond to international law violations by non–state actors. However, 
international law violations by non–state actors often lead to international law violations by states. For 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134932 
02-Hathaway (Do Not Delete) 7/6/2012 12:47:17 AM 
858 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:817 
 
be used if the international law violation has ceased. Countermeasures also can 
never justify the violation of fundamental human rights, humanitarian 
prohibitions on reprisals, or peremptory international norms, nor can they 
excuse failure to comply with dispute settlement procedures or to protect the 
inviolability of diplomats.172 
Before resorting to countermeasures, the injured state generally must call 
upon the responsible state to cease its wrongful conduct, notify it of the 
decision to employ countermeasures, and offer to negotiate a settlement.173 
However, in some situations, the injured state “may take such urgent 
countermeasures as are necessary to preserve its rights.”174 Countermeasures 
need not necessarily be reciprocal, but reciprocal measures are favored over 
other types because they are more likely to comply with the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality.175 
Under the customary law of countermeasures, an attacking state that 
violates its obligation not to intervene in another sovereign state through a 
harmful cyber-attack may be subject to lawful countermeasures by the injured 
state. Such countermeasures might go beyond “passive defenses” that aim to 
repel cyber-attacks (such as firewalls), and constitute “active defenses,” which 
attempt to disable the source of an attack.176 Active defenses—if properly 
designed to meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality—might be 
considered a form of “reciprocal countermeasures,” in which the injured state 
ceases obeying the same or a related obligation to the one the responsible state 
violated (in this case, the obligation of nonintervention). 
Before a state may use active defense as a countermeasure, however, it 
must determine that an internationally wrongful act caused the state harm and 
identify the state responsible, as well as abide by other restrictions.177 The 
countermeasures must be designed, for example, to induce the wrongdoing 
state to comply with its obligations. The Draft Articles also have detailed 
provisions regarding when acts committed by non–state agents may be 
example, if a non–state actor launches an attack on state A from state B’s territory and state B is 
unwilling or unable to stop it, state B may violate an international law obligation to prevent its territory 
from being used for cross-border attacks. See, e.g., Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania) (Merits), 
1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) (holding that states are obligated “not to allow knowingly its territory to be 
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”). In the cyber-attack context, a state may commit an 
international law violation by allowing harmful cyber-attacks to be launched from its territory. See 
Sklerov, supra note 93, at 62–72. 
172. Draft Articles, supra note 109, at 131. 
173. Id. at 135. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 129. 
176. DoD has recently made clear that it employs such “active cyber defense” to “detect and 
stop malicious activity before it can affect DoD networks and systems.” DOD STRATEGY, supra note 
32, at 7. 
177. Draft Articles, supra note 109, at 129–34. 
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attributed to a state—for instance, when the state aids and assists the act with 
knowledge of the circumstances.178  
While countermeasures provide states with a valuable tool for addressing 
cyber-attacks that do not rise to the level of an armed attack, countermeasures 
are far from a panacea. First and foremost, they require the identity of the 
attacker and the computer or network from which the attack originates to be 
accurately identified. Second, in order for a countermeasure to be effective, the 
targeted actor must find the countermeasure costly—ideally costly enough to 
cease its unlawful behavior. If the target can easily relocate its operations, as is 
often possible in the cyber context, the countermeasure may not impose a 
significant cost on the actor responsible for the attack. For this reason, 
countermeasures are likely to be more effective against state actors and less 
effective against non–state actors. Finally, it can be difficult to design a 
countermeasure that injures only the actor that perpetuated the legally wrongful 
attack. In particular, a countermeasure that disables a computer or network may 
very well cause harm to those who have little or nothing to do with the 
unlawful attacks. This could have the perverse effect of making the state 
injured by the original attack a perpetrator of an unlawful attack against those 
who simply happen to share a network with the actor that generated the original 
attack, or whose computers were used as pawns without its knowledge or 
acquiescence. Together, these challenges can lead a system that relies too 
heavily on active countermeasures to spin out of control. As a result, the 
customary law of countermeasures offers only a partial answer to the problem 
of cyber-attacks. We thus turn next to other international legal regimes that 
directly regulate cyber-attacks. 
B. International Legal Regimes That Directly Regulate Cyber-Attacks 
While no comprehensive international legal framework currently governs 
all cyber-attacks, a patchwork of efforts provides some tools the United States 
and other countries can employ to control this growing threat. This Section 
surveys legal mechanisms created by the United Nations, NATO, the Council 
of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization to directly regulate cyber-attacks. While both the Council of 
Europe and the Organization of American States have taken actions relating to 
cyber-crime—a category of activity that overlaps in part with cyber-attacks, as 
noted above—the increased computer network protection and regulations are 
also relevant to efforts to combat cyber-attacks. Collectively, these 
organizational measures demonstrate a growing interest in addressing this issue 
through common legal frameworks. Yet these efforts have thus far fallen short 
of establishing a rigorous legal framework that can effectively govern all cyber-
attacks. 
178. Id. at 65. 
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1. The United Nations 
There has been only limited U.N. action on the issue of cyber-security. 
The U.N. General Assembly has passed several related resolutions.179 These 
resolutions, however, are vague and have not required any specific action by 
U.N. members.180 
In August 1999, the United Nations sponsored an international meeting of 
experts in Geneva to better grasp the security implications of emerging 
information technologies.181 A follow-up General Assembly resolution in 2002 
called for further consideration and discussion of “information security.”182 The 
resolution also called for a new study of international informational security 
issues,183 but little action resulted.184 The United Nations sponsored a two-
phase summit in 2003 and 2005 called the World Summit on the Information 
Society, but again with little concrete result.185 
The United Nations did take a step forward in July 2010, when 
government cyber-security specialists from fifteen countries—including major 
179. These resolutions have been based on the ongoing agenda item: “Developments in the 
field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.” See, e.g., G.A. 
Res. 58/32, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/32 (Dec. 8, 2003); G.A. Res. 59/61, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/61 (Dec. 
3, 2004); G.A. Res. 60/45, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/45 (Jan. 6, 2006); G.A. Res. 61/54, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/54 (Dec. 19, 2006); G.A. Res. 62/17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/17 (Jan. 8, 2008); G.A. Res. 
63/37, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/37 (Jan. 9, 2009); G.A. Res. 64/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/25 (Jan. 14, 
2010). 
180. This is equally true of the General Assembly’s two related resolutions on the Creation of 
a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and the Protection of Critical Informational Infrastructures, G.A. 
Res. 58/199, U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/58/199 (Jan. 30, 2004), and Creation of a Global Culture of 
Cybersecurity and Taking Stock of National Efforts to Protect Critical Information Infrastructures, 
G.A. Res. 64/211, U.N. Doc. No. A/RES/64/211 (Mar. 17, 2010). 
181. G.A. Res. 54/49, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/49 (Dec. 23, 1999).  
182. Id. ¶ 1. The resolution called upon Member States to: 
promote further at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in 
the field of information security, as well as possible measures to limit the threats emerging 
in this field . . . [and] . . . [i]nvite[ed] all Member States to continue to inform the Secretary-
General of their views and assessments on the following questions:  
(a) General appreciation of the issues of information security;  
(b) Definition of basic notions related to information security, including 
unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and 
telecommunications systems and information resources . . . . 
Id. ¶¶ 1-3. 
183. Id. ¶ 4. 
184. Similar exhortations appear in subsequent resolutions. See G.A. Res. 58/32, supra note 
179, ¶ 4; G.A. Res. 59/61, supra note 179, ¶ 4; G.A. Res. 60/45, supra note 179, ¶ 4; G.A. Res. 61/54, 
supra note 179, ¶ 4; G.A. Res. 62/17, supra note 179, ¶ 4; G.A. Res. 63/37, supra note 179, ¶ 4; G.A. 
Res. 64/25, supra note 179, ¶ 4. 
185. See WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: GENEVA 2003–TUNIS 2005, 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012) (compiling conference documents and 
follow-up documents, including annual “outcome documents”); G.A. Res. 60/252, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/252 (Apr. 27, 2006) (“Urges Member States, relevant United Nations bodies and other 
intergovernmental organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations, civil society and the 
private sector, to contribute actively, inter alia by initiating actions, where appropriate, to the 
implementation and follow-up of the outcomes of the Geneva and Tunis phases of the Summit.”). 
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cyber-powers like the United States, China, and Russia—submitted a set of 
recommendations to the U.N. Secretary-General as “an initial step towards 
building the international framework for security and stability that these new 
technologies require.”186 The recommendations called for 
i. Further dialogue among States . . . ; 
ii. Confidence-building, stability and risk reduction measures . . . 
including exchanges of national views on the use of 
[information and communication technologies] in conflict; 
iii. Information exchanges on national legislation and national 
information and communications technologies security 
strategies and technologies, policies and best practices; 
iv. Identification of measures to support capacity-building in less 
developed countries; 
v. Finding possibilities to elaborate common terms and 
definitions . . . .187 
Though vague, these recommendations represent real progress in overcoming a 
long impasse between the United States and Russia over how to address cyber-
security issues.188 The cooperation may even suggest possibilities for a future 
multilateral treaty under the auspices of the United Nations, which Russia has 
been advocating for some time.189 At present, however, the role of the United 
Nations with respect to cyber-security remains largely limited to discussions 
and information sharing. 
2. NATO 
NATO recently began to address the threat of cyber-attacks. NATO did 
little in response to the 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia, laying bare that it “lacked 
both coherent cyber doctrine and comprehensive cyber strategy.”190 On the 
heels of that attack,191 NATO held its first meeting—the 2008 Bucharest 
186. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments 
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, 4, U.N. 
Doc. A/65/201 (July 30, 2010).  
187. Id. at 8. 
188. Historically Russia and the United States have expressed conflicting views on cyber-
security as it relates to sovereignty and political dissent as well as international cooperation. See, e.g., 
TIM MAURER, CYBER NORM EMERGENCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
ACTIVITIES AT THE UN REGARDING CYBER-SECURITY 1, 17, 25, 27, 47 (2011) (describing the 
contrasting views of the two countries). 
189. John Markoff, Step Taken to End Impasse over Cybersecurity Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 
2010, at A7. 
190. Rex B. Hughes, NATO and Cyber Defence: Mission Accomplished?, ATLANTISCH 
PERSPECTIEF (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.atlcom.nl/site/english/nieuws/wp-content/Hughes. 
pdf. 
191. This followed an October 2007 meeting of NATO defense ministers during which they 
called for the development of a NATO cyber-defense policy. NATO Opens New Centre of Excellence 
on Cyber Defence, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. NEWS (May 14, 2008), http://www.nato.int/docu/update/ 
2008/05-may/e0514a.html. 
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Summit—to formally address cyber-attacks. This summit prompted the 
creation of two new NATO divisions focused on cyber-attacks: the Cyber 
Defence Management Authority and the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence.192 
The Cyber Defence Management Authority aims to centralize cyber-
defense capabilities across NATO members. Although little information is 
publicly available, the Authority is believed to possess “real-time electronic 
monitoring capabilities for pinpointing threats and sharing critical cyber 
intelligence in real-time,” with the goal of eventually becoming an operational 
war room for cyber-defense.193 
The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence aspires to “advance 
the development of long-term NATO cyber defence doctrine and strategy.”194 
The North Atlantic Council, however, retains control of NATO cyber-policy 
and defense.195 Despite strong pressure from Eastern European countries, 
cyber-attacks are still considered to activate only Article 4 of the NATO treaty, 
which calls upon members to “consult together” in cases of cyber-attacks, but 
does not bind them to “assist” each other, as would be required under Article 
5.196 
Although NATO’s creation of these two divisions signifies concrete 
progress and recognition of the need for a more coherent cyber-strategy, 
concerns persist that “these teeth may not be sufficiently sharp to ward off any 
mischievous cyber bears or other e-adversaries seeking to compromise or 
destroy NATO digital assets deployed in either the Euro-Atlantic community or 
the ‘near abroad.’”197 NATO’s cyber-plans and capabilities are still nascent. 
3. Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe198 has taken the most direct and concrete approach 
to regulating a subset of the cyber-security problem—in particular, cyber-
crime—of any international organization to date. As the first international 
treaty on crimes committed using the Internet and other computer networks, the 
192. Hughes, supra note 190. This is NATO’s tenth COE, and is the only one focused solely 
on defending against and countering cyber-attacks. See Scott J. Shackelford, Estonia Three Years 
Later: A Progress Report on Combating Cyber Attacks, J. INTERNET L., Feb. 2010, at 22. 
193. Hughes, supra note 190. 
194. Id.  
195. Defending The Networks: The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. 
(2011), http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110914-policy-cyberdefen 
ce.pdf (“The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence reiterates that any collective defence response is subject 
to decisions of the North Atlantic Council.”). 
196. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 98, arts. 4, 5; see also NATO Agrees Common 
Approach to Cyber Defence, supra note 97 (“The competencies of the [Cyber Defence Management 
Authority] will fall exclusively on Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.”). 
197. Hughes, supra note 190. 
198. Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe aims to promote cooperation amongst its forty-
seven European member states. 
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2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (“Cybercrime 
Convention”) promulgated “a common criminal policy aimed at the protection 
of society against cybercrime,” primarily through legislation and international 
cooperation.199 The United States ratified the Convention in 2006.200 
Cyber-attacks implicate the Cybercrime Convention’s offenses relating to 
“confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and systems”—
particularly illegal access, data interference, and system interference.201 These 
rules, however, do not appear to apply to government actions, whether taken 
for law enforcement or national security purposes.202 For example, Article 2 of 
the Convention requires that states adopt “legislative and other measures . . . to 
establish as criminal offenses under [their] domestic law, when committed 
intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without 
right.”203 The Convention’s accompanying “explanatory report” clarifies that 
the “without right” caveat allows for classic legal defenses, such as self-defense 
or necessity, but also “leaves unaffected conduct undertaken pursuant to lawful 
government authority”—including acts to “maintain public order, protect 
national security or investigate criminal offences.”204 This suggests, as Duncan 
Hollis and others have argued, that the Convention negotiators were aware of 
state interests in using cyber-attacks and sought to draft the agreement to permit 
such governmental action.205 
Nonetheless, the Cybercrime Convention may still impose limited 
constraints on the execution of cyber-attack operations by ratifying countries. 
Parties to the Convention have agreed to “co-operate with each other . . . to the 
widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations or proceedings 
199. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 64, pmbl.; see also Rasha AlMahroos, Phishing for 
the Answer: Recent Developments in Combating Phishing, 3 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 595, 
613 (2008) (“The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime . . . is the first and only international 
treaty that deals explicitly with cybercrime.”). 
200. The convention allows members of the Council of Europe and other states that 
participated in its elaboration (among them the United States) to join the Convention. Cybercrime 
Convention, supra note 66, at ch. IV; Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Senate Ratifies 
Controversial Cybercrime Treaty, CNET, (Aug. 4, 2006, 11:25 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Senate-
ratifies-controversial-cybercrime-treaty/2100-7348_3-6102354.html. As of January 2012, thirty 
countries have ratified the Convention on Cybercrime, and another sixteen have signed but have not 
yet ratified it (including Australia, Japan, and South Africa). Convention on Cybercrime, TREATY 
OFFICE, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185& 
CM=8&DF=28/10/2010&CL=ENG (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
201. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 66, arts. 2, 4, 5.  
202. See Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under 
International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 171 (2009) (“However, [the Cybercrime Convention’s] rules 
do not apply to government activities, whether for law enforcement or national security purposes.”); 
Hollis, supra note 10, at 1052 (“[The Cybercrime Convention’s] rules, however, do not apply to 
government activities, whether for law enforcement or national security purposes.”). 
203. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 66, art. 2 (emphasis added). 
204. Council of Eur., Convention on Cybercrime: Explanatory Report, 109th Sess., ¶ 38 (Nov. 
8, 2001), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/185.htm. 
205. Hollis, supra note 10. 
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concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data.”206 
Although not explicit, this agreement to cooperate could limit the extent to 
which parties to the Convention could conduct cyber-attacks against other state 
parties, since that would undermine the overall intent of the agreement. It is 
unclear, however, what consequences or repercussions would result from such 
a breach of the Convention’s intent and purpose by a state party. 
For these reasons, the Convention—the most developed international legal 
framework directly regulating cyber-attacks—addresses only a portion of the 
overall challenge. It is limited, in particular, both by its failure to regulate most 
attacks by state parties and by its largely regional membership. Yet it offers a 
starting point for designing a comprehensive international framework for 
regulating unlawful cyber-attacks. 
4. Organization of American States 
The Organization of American States (“OAS”), representing thirty-five 
states from the Americas,207 only recently began taking preliminary action to 
regulate cyber-attacks. In April 2004, the OAS approved a resolution stating 
that member states should “evaluate the advisability of implementing the 
principles of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (2001)” and 
should “consider the possibility of acceding to that convention.”208 The OAS 
also adopted a “Comprehensive Inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy,” which 
aims, among other things, to adopt “cybercrime policies and legislation that 
will protect Internet users and prevent and deter criminal misuse of computers 
and computer networks, while respecting the privacy and individual rights of 
Internet users.”209 To this end, the OAS agreed to deploy an Experts Group that 
will “provide technical assistance to Member States in drafting and enacting 
laws that punish cybercrime, protect information systems, and prevent the use 
of computers to facilitate illegal activity.”210 These experts only offer guidance; 
the OAS is not promulgating a set of uniform laws with which member states 
can combat cyber-crime and cyber-attacks. 
At a January 2010 meeting, the OAS Working Group on Cyber-Crime 
recommended that members that had not already done so establish state bodies 
for investigating and prosecuting cyber-crimes and adopt domestic legislation 
206. Cybercrime Convention, supra note 66, art. 23. 
207. The OAS aims for its member states to achieve “an order of peace and justice, to promote 
their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial 
integrity, and their independence.” Charter of the Organization of American States art. 1, available at 
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.htm.  
208. Organization of American States, AG/RES. 2040 (XXXIV-O/04), at ch. IV, ¶ 8 (June 8, 
2004), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga04/agres_2040.htm.  
209. Organization of American States, AG/RES. 2004 (XXXIV-O/04), at app. A, (June 8, 
2004), available at http://www.oas.org/XXXIVGA/english/docs/approved_documents/adoption_ 
strategy_combat_threats_cybersecurity.htm.  
210. Id. 
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criminalizing cyber-crime and enabling international cooperation to investigate 
and prosecute such crimes.211 The Working Group pledged to review the 
progress made in implementing these measures at its next meeting.212 The OAS 
has thus begun a useful regional conversation on joint strategies for battling the 
portion of cyber-attacks that constitute cyber-crime, but it has not yet 
developed a more active program for addressing cyber-attacks more generally. 
5. Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, an intergovernmental mutual 
security organization founded in 2001 by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan,213 has taken significant preliminary steps 
toward cooperation in the cyber-security area. In its Yekaterinburg Declaration 
of June 16, 2009, “[t]he SCO member states stress[ed] the significance of the 
issue of ensuring international information security as one of the key elements 
of the common system of international security.”214 The Organization presents 
a possible center of gravity in international legal action on cyber-attacks. As 
explained above,215 the Organization has thus far adopted an expansive 
understanding of cyber-attacks that includes the use of cyber-technology to 
undermine political stability. As such, it represents a model that is likely to be 
at odds with that of Western Europe and the United States, which have sought 
to avoid regulations of cyber-activities that may interfere with the expression of 
political dissent.216 
As this Section demonstrates, international efforts to regulate cyber-
attacks are still at an embryonic stage. With the possible exception of the 
Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, most international agreements 
have not proceeded beyond the stage of discussing future strategies. 
Nonetheless, the widespread efforts demonstrate increasing interest in 
establishing a set of transnational regulations to address cyber-attacks. The 
diversity of approaches taken by these organizations also demonstrates that the 
central challenge—at least initially—will be defining the scope of the activity 
that should be addressed in an international agreement. Before we outline our 
recommendations for future efforts at directly regulating cyber-attacks, 
however, we first must complete the existing legal picture by outlining the 
211. Organization of American States, Sixth Meeting of the Working Group on Cyber-Crime, 
Recommendations, Jan. 21–22, 2010, OEA/Ser.K/XXXIV, CIBER-VI/doc.4/10 rev. 1, ¶¶ 1–2, 
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/cyb_VIrec_en.pdf.  
212. Id. ¶ 17. 
213. These six countries are the only members of the SCO, though others are able to 
participate as observer states, dialogue partners, and guest attendees. More information on the SCO 
can be found here: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm.  
214. CONSULATE GEN. OF UZB. IN N.Y.C., YEKATERINBURG DECLARATION OF THE HEADS 
OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION, (July 9, 2009), 
http://www.uzbekconsulny.org/news/572/.  
215. See supra text accompanying notes 24–27. 
216. MAURER, supra note 188. 
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international regimes that indirectly regulate cyber-attacks as well as the 
domestic laws that address cyber-attacks. 
C. International Legal Regimes That Indirectly Regulate Cyber-Attacks 
Several international legal frameworks are not directly aimed at cyber-
attacks but nonetheless regulate means that may be used in or may be a focus of 
a cyber-attack. These include, most notably, the international law governing 
telecommunications, aviation, space, and the law of sea.217 These legal regimes 
were largely formed prior to the emergence of cyber-attacks and therefore do 
not expressly regulate or prohibit cyber-attacks. Instead, these “means-based” 
frameworks can be used to address a cyber-attack only if the attack employs the 
particular means regulated by the agreement.218 Hence the international regimes 
that indirectly regulate cyber-attacks provide a patchwork of laws that are 
likely to apply to only a small portion of harmful cyber-attacks. 
1. Telecommunications Law 
Cyber-attacks that involve international wire or radio frequency 
communications may be subject to telecommunications law. Modern 
international telecommunications law is regulated by the International 
Telecommunications Union, the leading U.N. agency that establishes 
217. While a number of countries have recognized Internet access as a human right, we do not 
discuss it here, due to its diffuse and currently unenforceable status. See, e.g., David Meyer, European 
‘Internet Freedom’ Law Agreed, ZDNET (Nov. 5, 2009, 1:11 PM), http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/ 
networking/2009/11/05/european-internet-freedom-law-agreed-39860587/. It therefore would not offer 
an alternate governing legal framework for cyber-attack with any practical significance. Moreover, the 
right to access the Internet does not implicate one of the key elements of our proposed cyber-attack 
definition: a national security or political purpose. 
218. See Richard W. Aldrich, The International Legal Implications of Information Warfare, 
AIRPOWER J., Fall 1996, at 99, 109, available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/aldrich.pdf 
(“[M]ost of the law to which legal scholars are looking for guidance was developed, in many cases, 
decades before information warfare concepts were envisioned.”); Barkham, supra note 122, at 95–96 
(discussing existing treaty regimes that could be used to regulate information warfare); Dimitrios 
Delibasis, State Use of Force in Cyberspace for Self-Defence: A New Challenge for a New Century, 
PEACE, CONFLICT & DEV.: AN INTERDISC. J., Feb. 2006, at 1; BRYAN W. ELLIS, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF INFORMATION WARFARE: WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS? 3–
4 (Apr. 10, 2001) (USAWC Strategy Research Project) (explaining how a network attack may 
implicate existing international telecommunications law); Schaap, supra note 202, at 160–70 
(discussing other treaties and conventions that could impact cyber warfare operations, including the 
International Outer Space Law, International Telecommunications Law, and International Aviation 
Law); Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in 
International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 191, 250–51 (2009) (“To the extent that cyber attacks are 
below the threshold of an armed attack, provisions of space law, nuclear non-proliferation, UNCLOS, 
and communications law, all have a role to play in crafting a functioning legal regime.”); David 
Willson, A Global Problem: Cyberspace Threats Demand an International Approach, ISSA J., Aug. 
2009, at 12, available at http://www.issa.org/Library/Journals/2009/August/Willson-A%20Global%20 
Problem.pdf; William Yurcik, Information Warfare: Legal & Ethical Challenges of the Next Global 
Battleground, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE 1 
(1997). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2134932 
02-Hathaway (Do Not Delete) 7/6/2012 12:47:17 AM 
2012] THE LAW OF CYBER-ATTACK 867 
 
multinational standards for information and communication technology.219 The 
Union’s stated aim is “the preservation of peace and the economic and social 
development of all States . . . by means of efficient telecommunications 
services.”220 The International Telecommunications Union enacts rules known 
as Administrative Regulations, which are treaties that bind all member parties; 
Radio Regulations, which also bind all parties; as well as nonbinding 
Telecommunications Standards.221 The Union regulates the use of radio and 
telecommunication technologies in order to distribute them to member states in 
an efficient and equitable manner—for example, through developing methods 
of assigning rights to radio spectrums.222 
International Telecommunication regulations may be used to address 
cyber-attacks that make use of electromagnetic spectrum or international 
telecommunications networks. For instance, broadcasting stations from one 
nation may not interfere with broadcasts of other states’ services on their 
authorized frequencies.223 Member states may cut off any nonstate private 
telecommunications that “may appear dangerous to the security of the State or 
contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency”224 or suspend international 
telecommunication services “either generally or only for certain relations 
and/or for certain kinds of correspondence, outgoing, incoming or in transit, 
provided that it immediately notifies such action to each of the other Member 
States through the Secretary-General.”225 Member states also must regulate 
against “harmful interference”226 that “endangers the functioning of a 
radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, 
obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service”227 and pursue 
all possible measures to ensure the secrecy of international correspondence, 
219. CHARLES H. KENNEDY & M. VERONICA PASTOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 30–33 (1996). The International Telecommunications 
Convention is the founding charter that established the ITU. The ITU first began in 1865 as the 
International Telegraph Union and was founded in order to universalize telegraph services among 
mostly European nations. Id. at 30–32. It is based in Geneva, Switzerland, and its membership includes 
193 member states and more than seven hundred sector members and associates. About ITU, INT’L 
COMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/net/about/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). The full text of the 
Convention is available at Basic Texts of ITU, INT’L COMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/net/about/ 
basic-texts/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
220. Constitution of the International Telecommunications Union, pmbl., Dec. 22, 1992, 
available at http://itu.int/net/about/basic-texts/index.aspx [hereinafter ITU Constitution]; see also 
International Telecommunications Convention, Nov. 6, 1982, U.N. Doc. 26559. 
221. KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 219, at 33. 
222. More information about the agency’s work is available at Committed to Connecting the 
World, INT’L COMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012); see 
also The ITU Mission: Bringing the Benefits of ICT to All the World’s Inhabitants, INT’L COMM. 
UNION, http://www.itu.int/net/about/mission.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).  
223. ITU Constitution, supra note 220, art. 45. 
224. Id. art. 34. 
225. Id. art. 35. 
226. Id. art. 6.  
227. Id. annex. (definition of “harmful interference”). 
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unless such secrecy would contravene their domestic laws or international 
conventions.228 
Despite the above restrictions, international telecommunications law does 
not specifically prohibit the use of telecommunications for military purposes, 
such as cyber-attacks. Article 48 states that “Member States retain their entire 
freedom with regard to military radio installations.”229 The article requests that 
states limit such use: “Nevertheless, these installations must, so far as possible, 
observe . . . the measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference.”230 The 
International Telecommunications Union cautions against “harmful 
interference,” but it allows for military transgressions of these regulations—
without requiring a reporting mechanism or otherwise limiting its use. This 
exception might include within its scope cyber-attacks and possibly even cyber-
warfare. In addition to this military exception, the International 
Telecommunication Union provisions have a second important limitation as a 
legal framework for regulating cyber-attacks: violations of Union rules and 
regulations have only limited repercussions, given that the Union possesses 
little enforcement or punitive capacity.231 
2. Aviation Law 
Cyber-attack operations that target or interfere with nonmilitary aviation 
could implicate three major aviation regulations: the 1944 Chicago Convention 
on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention),232 the 1971 Montreal 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Civil Aviation 
228. Id. art. 37. 
229. Id. art. 48(1). 
230. Id. art. 48(2). 
231. The International Telecommunication Union’s main “regulatory” body originally was the 
International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB), which was formed “to manage the [radio 
frequency] spectrum internationally and to solve arising problems in a neutral manner.” Wladyslaw 
Moron, Radio Regulations Board (RRB): ‘Its Place, Role and Functioning in the ITU,’ INT’L 
TELECOMM. UNION (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/information/promotion/e-flash/4/ 
article7.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). Its founders envisioned it as a “cross between the Federal 
Communication Commission and the International Court of Justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). This board, however, was never empowered to uphold its adjudicatory visions. Id. In 1994, 
the Radio Regulations Board subsumed the IFRB, aiming to act as an “independent interpreter and 
mediator” when dealing with noncompliance and sometimes conflicting interests of member states. Id. 
Even the Board, however, does not have full regulatory authority, since it can only issue 
recommendations when cases of “harmful interference” arise. The International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU): Structure, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/ 
United-Nations-Related-Agencies/The-International-Telecommunication-Union-ITU-STRUCTURE. 
html#b (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). Furthermore, ITU resolutions are not considered legally binding. 
See STEPHEN GOROVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW: ISSUES AND POLICIES 49 (1991) (“While 
states generally abide by ITU resolutions, they are not legally bound by them.”). 
232. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180 [hereinafter 
Chicago Convention]. 
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(Montreal Convention),233 and the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation 
(Montreal Protocol).234 For example, the disruption of air traffic control, the 
modification of flight passenger lists, or the addition of a name to a country’s 
no-fly list all exemplify cyber-attacks that implicate aviation law.235 
The 1944 Chicago Convention created a specialized U.N. agency tasked 
with coordinating and regulating international air travel.236 It also established a 
set of rules on airspace, aircraft, navigation, registration, and safety.237 The 
Convention stipulates that all states must show “due regard for the safety of 
navigation of civil aircraft.”238 Cyber-attack operations that target civilian 
flights, if launched by a government against another actor, could run counter to 
this Convention’s safeguard against interference with civilian flights. Such an 
operation would also run afoul of the 1984 amendment against using weapons 
targeting a civil aircraft in flight.239 However, the Convention does allow a 
member state to derogate from the Convention’s obligations during war or state 
emergencies,240 so long as the state “notifies the fact to the Council.”241 
The Montreal Convention outlines as unlawful specific conduct that could 
jeopardize the safety of civil aviation.242 Article 1 states that a person commits 
a crime if he or she intentionally and unlawfully does or attempts to do a series 
of acts that would render an aircraft incapable of flight or would seriously 
endanger the safety of the aircraft while in flight, including through 
“destroy[ing] or damag[ing] air navigation facilities or interfer[ing] with their 
operation, . . . or communicat[ing] information which he [or she] knows to be 
false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight.”243 This agreement 
would not seem to restrict any cyber-attack operations unless it rendered an 
aircraft unable to fly (for example, by interfering with the aircraft’s operating 
system) or endangered the safety of an aircraft in flight (for example, 
interfering with air traffic control communication or other aspects of aircraft 
navigation). 
233. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. 
234. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
235. Schaap, supra note 202, at 166. 
236. Chicago Convention, supra note 232, arts. 43, 44. The agency is called the International 
Civil Aviation Organization. Id. 
237. Id. pt. I. 
238. Id. art. 3(d).  
239. This 1984 amendment to the Chicago Convention “reaffirm[s] the principle of non-use of 
weapons against civil aircraft in flight.” Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, pmbl., May 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 705. 
240. Chicago Convention, supra note 232, art. 89. 
241. Id. 
242. Montreal Convention, supra note 233. 
243. Id. art. 1. 
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The Montreal Protocol extended the legal framework from civil aircraft in 
flight to “acts of violence which endanger or are likely to endanger the safety of 
persons at airports . . . or which jeopardize the safe operation of such 
airports.”244 Article 2 states that a person commits a crime if he or she 
intentionally and unlawfully does or attempts to do any of the following while 
using a device, substance, or weapon: 
(a) performs an act of violence against a person at an airport 
serving international civil aviation which causes or is likely to 
cause serious injury or death; or 
(b) destroys or seriously damages the facilities of an airport 
serving international civil aviation or aircraft not in service 
located thereon or disrupts the services of the airport, 
if such an act endangers or is likely to endanger safety at that 
airport.245 
This Protocol thereby prohibits any cyber-attacks that could undermine safety 
at an international airport, such as tampering with no-fly lists, passenger 
manifests, or an airport’s computer network system.  
3. Law of Space 
Given that computer-operated satellites are integral to international 
telecommunications and military operations, cyber-attacks could implicate 
space law. Multiple scholars have proposed that treaties on outer space, the 
moon, and damage caused by space objects, as well as satellite regulations, 
could be used to regulate cyber-attacks.246 Treaties related to the damage 
caused by space objects247 or the moon248 are clearly inapplicable to cyber-
244. Montreal Protocol, supra note 234, pmbl. 
245. Id. art. 2. 
246. Aldrich, supra note 218, at 20–24; Delibasis, supra note 218, at 15–17 (discussing how 
the law of space is applicable to cyber-warfare); LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION 
WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 (1998) (“Space law, though, leaves ample room for 
information warfare.”); Hollis, supra note 10, at 1051 (“[B]ecause information infrastructures 
frequently use outer space to relay communications or collect data, space law may affect [information 
operations].”); Schaap, supra note 202, at 160–69 (discussing international outer space law, 
international telecommunications law, and international aviation law as legal regimes that states should 
consider in developing cyber-warfare operations). 
247. The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects lays out 
a set of procedures for determining state liability for activities in outer space. Article 2 states that “[a] 
launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object 
on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.” Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects, art 2, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187. The Convention 
defines damage as “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to 
property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental 
organizations.” Id. art 1. It is unlikely, however, that the definition of damage or of space object would 
apply to cyber-attacks. 
248. The Moon Treaty grants the international community jurisdiction over all heavenly 
bodies, including the orbits around such bodies. Agreement Governing the Activities of States in Outer 
Space, on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 53. The treaty refers to 
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attacks as we have defined them, and therefore we do not discuss them here. 
Instead, we focus on satellite regulations and the Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities in the Exploitation and Use of Outer Space. We 
conclude, however, that these treaties also have little promise for the regulation 
of cyber-attacks.  
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty provides for the free exploration of space 
and prohibits the use of space for particular destructive purposes.249 It stipulates 
that 
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the 
Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, 
or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. 
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties 
to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.250 
The Outer Space Treaty expressly permits certain military uses of space, such 
as earth orbit military reconnaissance satellites, remote sensing satellites, 
military global positioning systems, and space-based aspects of an antiballistic 
missile system.251 Because cyber-attacks are unlikely to cause mass destruction 
of the kind contemplated in the treaty, it is unlikely that cyber-attacks could be 
properly characterized as prohibited by the treaty.252 
Satellite regulations offer another potential avenue for cyber-attack 
regulation. The Agreement Relating to the 1971 International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (“Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization”)253 and the Convention of the 1979 International Maritime 
Satellite Organization (“Maritime Satellite Organization”)254 contain “peaceful 
purpose” provisions applicable to satellites similar to the Outer Space Treaty. 
the “common heritage of mankind,” reflecting a belief that all nations should share equitably in 
benefits derived from resources on the moon and other celestial bodies. Id. art. 11(1). The treaty also 
underscores that the moon should be used exclusively for “peaceful purposes.” Id. art. 3. Beyond this 
principle, however, the treaty offers little concrete means by which cyber-warfare could be regulated. 
Furthermore, the countries and organizations mainly engaged in space exploration, such as the United 
States, the European Union, Russia, China, and Japan, have not ratified the treaty. As of January 1, 
2011, only thirteen states had ratified and four signed the Moon Treaty. U.N. Office for Outer Space 
Affairs, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of International Agreements Relating to 
Activities in Outer Space, U.N. Doc. ST/SPACE/11/Rev.2/Add/3 (2011). 
249. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205. 
250. Id. art. 4. 
251. Shackelford, supra note 218, at 219. 
252. Celestial bodies “refers only to natural bodies, such as the moon, asteroids, and planets, 
not to man-made satellites,” the main means in outer space by which cyber-warfare could be 
conducted. Aldrich, supra note 218, at 20.  
253. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, 
“INTELSAT,” Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813 [hereinafter Telecommunications Satellite Agreement]. 
254. Convention of the International Maritime Satellite Organization London, Sept. 3, 1976, 
31 U.S.T. 1 [hereinafter INMARSAT]. 
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However, despite the fact that satellites are likely to have a role in cyber-
attacks, these treaties have little utility in regulating attacks. The 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization, which initially formed as an 
intergovernmental body mandated to “carry forward . . . the design, 
development, construction, establishment, operation and maintenance of the 
space segment of the global commercial telecommunications satellite 
system,”255 was privatized in 2000.256 Similarly, the Maritime Satellite 
Organization has largely ceased to represent intergovernmental interests.257 
Consequently, neither organization is well situated to promulgate public 
regulations related to cyber-attacks. 
4. Law of the Sea 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”)—particularly articles 19, 109, and 113—tangentially implicates 
cyber-attack operations at sea.258 The article 19 obligation, which allows a 
vessel the right of innocent passage through another nation’s territorial sea so 
long as its activities are not “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of 
the coastal State,”259 is widely accepted as customary international law.260 
Activities prohibited by article 19 include 
255. Telecommunications Satellite Agreement, supra note 253, art. 2. 
256. To “promote a more competitive global satellite services market,” the 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization became a private company in 2000 named “Intelsat.” U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: INTELSAT PRIVATIZATION AND THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORBIT ACT 1 (2004).  
257. The Maritime Satellite Organization, originally founded as a nonprofit international 
organization to establish a maritime satellite communications network, changed its name to 
“International Mobile Satellite Organization” when it began to provide services to aircraft and portable 
users. JONATHAN HIGGINS, SATELLITE NEWSGATHERING 247–48 (2d ed. 2007). In 1999, the 
organization divided into two separate parts: most converted into a commercial company, and a small 
group became the intergovernmental regulatory body, the International Mobile Satellite 
Organization (IMSO). Id. at 248. Through a private-public partnership, the IMSO oversees certain 
public satellite safety and security communication services provided by Inmarsat satellites.  
258. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 19, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. The United States has not ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
even though it has been abiding by the Convention since President Regan’s 1983 Statement of Oceans 
Policy, and it signed the 1994 Agreement Relating to Implementation of Part XI. Nonetheless, many of 
the provisions of the Convention are considered binding on the United States and other countries as 
customary international law. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Table Recapitulating the 
Status of the Convention and of the Related Agreements, as at 20 September 2011, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf; Senator Richard G. Lugar, The Law of 
the Sea Convention: The Case for Senate Action, Address at the Brookings Institution (May 4, 2004), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2004/0504energy_lugar.aspx (discussing the United 
States abiding by the Law of the Sea Convention). 
259. UNCLOS, supra note 258, art. 19(1).  
260. RÜDIGER WOLFRUM, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION: NEW CHALLENGES (2008), available 
at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/statements_of_president/wolfrum/freedom_naviga 
tion_080108_eng.pdf. 
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(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in 
any other manner in violation of the principles of international 
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
. . . 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the 
defence or security of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or 
security of the coastal State; 
. . . 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of 
communication or any other facilities or installations of the 
coastal State . . . .261 
These regulations, particularly part (k), could be read to prohibit cyber-attacks 
that make use of computer systems on vessels that are at sea. 
Similarly, article 109 stipulates that all states should cooperate in 
suppressing unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas.262 UNCLOS defines 
“unauthorized broadcasting” as “the transmission of sound radio or television 
broadcasts from a ship or installation on the high seas intended for reception by 
the general public contrary to international regulations, but excluding the 
transmission of distress calls.”263 The prohibition could extend to a cyber-attack 
that compromises the computer network that operates a ship’s broadcast 
system.264 Similarly, article 113 requires states to put in place “laws and 
regulations necessary” to punish willful damage to submarine cables, including 
damage caused by a cyber-attack.265 Thus, by prohibiting actions that 
undermine the functioning of communications systems at sea, these provisions 
provide some minimal legal protections against cyber-attacks that occur on or 
originate from the high seas. 
Together, international law governing telecommunications, aviation, 
space, and the sea provide potentially effective tools for addressing forms of 
cyber-attack within specific contexts. Yet this patchwork of regulations fails to 
provide a complete or coherent mechanism for addressing all forms of cyber-
attacks. Given the limits of current international law, the following Section 
considers how U.S. domestic law might be used to address cyber-attacks. 
261. UNCLOS, supra note 258, art. 19(2).  
262. Id. art. 109(1). 
263. Id. art. 109(2). 
264. Id. art. 109(3). In particular, article 109(3) states that prosecution may occur in “the court 
of: (a) the flag State of the ship; (b) the State of registry of the installation; (c) the State of which the 
person is a national; (d) any State where the transmissions can be received; or (e) any State where 
authorized radio communication is suffering interference.” Id. 
265. Id. art. 113. 
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D. U.S. Domestic Law 
Domestic law offers an important tool for combating cyber-attacks, 
including those that cross international borders. Because many cyber-attacks 
are also cyber-crimes,266 domestic criminal law is particularly relevant. 
Unfortunately, existing domestic law largely fails to directly address the novel 
modern challenges posed by cyber-attacks,267 and is severely limited by its lack 
of extraterritorial reach. 
Although there is no U.S. federal statute that directly criminalizes cyber-
attacks,268 there is extensive federal criminal law that offers an important legal 
tool for addressing cyber-attacks.269 At the federal level, criminal laws address 
fraud involving devices, computers, or email;270 malicious interference in 
communications lines, stations, or systems;271 electronic communication 
interception;272 illicit access to electronic communications and records;273 and 
recording of dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information.274 
The majority of existing criminal laws bearing on cyber-attack do not 
apply extraterritorially—that is, they do not reach criminal activity occurring 
outside the United States.275 There are, however, some exceptions to that 
266. See supra Part I.A.3 and Figure 1. 
267. See, e.g., Sklerov, supra note 93, at 6 (“Unfortunately, state responses to cyberattacks are 
governed by an anachronistic legal regime that impairs a state’s ability to defend itself.”).  
268. As this Article went to print, several cyber-security bills had been proposed but none 
passed. See Brendan Sasso, Senate Dems Modifying Cybersecurity Bill to Pick Up GOP Votes, 
HILLICON VALLEY (May 6, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/225607-senate-
dems-revamping-cybersecurity-bill-; Ellen Nakashima, On Hill, Imagining a Cyberattack on New 
York, WASH. POST CHECKPOINT WASHINGTON (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/officials-use-nyc-blackout-scenario-to-sell-senators-on-cyber-
attack-legislation/2012/03/09/gIQA9Z530R_blog.html. 
269. In addition to criminal liability, there have been proposals for the use of tort law against 
cyber-attackers or intermediaries who negligently facilitate cyber-attack. See, e.g., Michael D. Scott, 
Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425 
(2008); Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in 
Cyberspace 1, 31–32 (2011) (unpublished research paper) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979857). Such proposals face a number of serious challenges, however, 
including attribution and jurisdictional problems, id. at 30, and, for intermediaries, causation problems 
and a virtual “tax on technophobia, punishing those who do not know enough about protecting their 
personal computers,” id. at 32. Moreover, if software designers were held liable for leaving their 
products vulnerable to cyber-attack, software costs could increase substantially. Id. 
270. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029, 1030, 1037 (2006). 18 U.S.C. § 1030 is the codification of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
271. Id. § 1362. 
272. Id. §§ 2510–2522. 
273. Id. §§ 2701–2712. 
274. Id. §§ 3121–3127. 
275. There is generally a presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law. See 
United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1973). Nevertheless, “Congress has the authority 
to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States,” and may do so by evidence 
of its intent as gauged through statutory interpretation. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 
248 (1991) (internal citations omitted). In certain cases, extraterritorial reach may also be extended 
without explicit or implied congressional authorization based on detrimental effects in the United 
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general rule. For example, the criminal statute banning access device fraud, as 
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, provides that 
[a]ny person who, outside the jurisdiction of the United States, engages 
in any act that, if committed within the jurisdiction of the United 
States, would constitute an offense under . . . this section, shall be 
subject to the fines, penalties, imprisonment, and forfeiture provided in 
this title if— 
1. the offense involves an access device issued, owned, 
managed, or controlled by a[n] . . . entity within the 
jurisdiction of the United States; and 
2. the person transports, delivers, conveys, transfers to or 
through, or otherwise stores, secrets, or holds within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, any article used to assist in 
the commission of the offense or the proceeds of such offense 
or property derived therefrom.276 
The statute banning computer fraud was likewise amended as part of the USA 
PATRIOT Act to provide for extraterritorial applicability.277 Both of these 
statutes may serve as useful models for extending extraterritorial application to 
other domestic laws related to cyber-attack. 
In addition, several recent legislative efforts tackle pieces of the cyber-
attack threat not addressed by U.S. criminal law. These include the 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act;278 the Executive Cyberspace Authorities Act 
of 2010;279 the Rockefeller-Snowe Cybersecurity Act;280 the International 
Cyberspace and Cybersecurity Coordination Act of 2010;281 and the Protecting 
Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010.282 
The most widely discussed of these efforts has been the Protecting 
Cyberspace as a National Asset Act, cowritten by Senators Lieberman, Collins, 
and Carper, which was introduced in the Senate and the House in June 2010.283 
The bill builds on the military’s recent establishment of the U.S. Cyber 
States. See United States v. Muench, 694 F.2d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The intent to cause effects 
within the United States . . . makes it reasonable to apply to persons outside United States territory a 
statute which is not expressly extraterritorial in scope.”).  
276. 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES, 
supra note 65, at 94, 115.  
277. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (“[T]he term ‘protected computer’ [to which this statute applies] 
means a computer . . . which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a 
computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign 
commerce or communication of the United States.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING 
COMPUTER CRIMES, supra note 66, at 5. 
278. H.R. 4061, 111th Cong. (2010). 
279. H.R. 5247, 111th Cong. (2010). 
280. S. 773, 111th Cong. (2009). 
281. S. 3193, 111th Cong. (2010).  
282. S. 3480, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 5548, 111th Cong. (2010). 
283. S. 3480; H.R. 5548.  
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Command284 by proposing the establishment of two new administrative bodies: 
(1) an Office of Cyberspace Policy in the White House, charged with 
developing and coordinating a national strategy to increase the security and 
resiliency of cyberspace; and (2) a National Center for Cybersecurity and 
Communications within the Department of Homeland Security, designed to 
“enable automated and continuous monitoring of any information collected” 
and “use [of] the information to enhance the risk-based security of the Federal 
information infrastructure.”285 The bill also addresses a wide range of related 
cyber-security matters, including definitions and federal information security 
management provisions.286 
The bill sparked a vigorous debate over the proper role of the government 
in regulating cyberspace. Opponents dubbed the proposed regulation the “kill 
switch bill,” seeing it as an effort to grant the president emergency powers over 
certain Internet communications.287 However, had it passed into law, the bill 
would likely have established more checks on the president’s power to respond 
to cyber-emergencies than currently exist.288 Its authors amended and 
reintroduced the bill, but it has made little progress toward a vote on the Senate 
floor.289 It has since been superseded by alternative proposals, none of which 
has yet won the approval of Congress.290 
This debate offers an important lesson for advocates of cyber-attack 
regulation: any future law must clearly indicate what activities are to be 
covered, place a high and transparent bar on emergency measures, and address 
well-founded concerns that efforts to strengthen cyber-security might 
simultaneously weaken free and open access to modern technology for those 
engaging in political speech and organizing. 
Other domestic legal efforts to address cyber-attacks are either based in 
criminal law or have focused on developing U.S. defensive capabilities. 
However, none of the recent legislative efforts that might strengthen defensive 
capacity against cyber-attack have yet been made into law. Moreover, the 
existing domestic law framework is insufficient for addressing the larger global 
284. McMichael, supra note 39.  
285. S. 3480; H.R. 5548. 
286. S. 3480; H.R. 5548. 
287. See Emelie Rutherford, Senate Committee OKs Cybersecurity Bill on Majority Leader’s 
Radar, DEFENSE DAILY (June 25, 2010), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6712/is_61_246/ 
ai_n54561980/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). The bill has since been reintroduced with changes meant to 
prevent the government from using a “kill switch” to shut off Internet service as a political tool. Id.; see 
also Diane Bartz, Reid Pushes US Republicans for Cybersecurity Bill, REUTERS (July 27, 2011, 5:09 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/congress-cybersecurity-idUSN1E76Q1M320110727.  
288. See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 287 (describing congressional “frustration . . . that 
people have misconstrued a provision related to the president’s emergency powers to take over 
communications networks” when “[t]he president already has this authority, . . . and the bill would 
restrict when he can use it”). 
289. See id.; Bartz, supra note 287.  
290. See supra note 268. 
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problem.291 In particular, the lack of extraterritorial reach of most criminal laws 
that apply to cyber-attacks severely limits their ability to reach those initiating 
such cyber-attacks, who are often located outside the United States. The next 
Part offers recommendations for remedying the substantial limitations of both 
the domestic and international legal frameworks for addressing cyber-attack. 
IV. 
NEW LAW FOR CYBER-ATTACKS 
Cyber-attacks present a new and growing threat—one that current 
international and domestic laws are not yet fully prepared to meet. The law of 
war offers a basis for responding only to those cyber-attacks that amount to an 
armed attack or that take place in the context of an ongoing armed conflict. 
Other existing international legal frameworks offer only embryonic or 
piecemeal protection. U.S. domestic law, though potentially a powerful tool for 
battling cyber-attacks, has not yet addressed the challenge directly, and what 
remedies exist are in many cases restricted by jurisdictional limits. 
To begin to fill the gaps in existing law, we propose legal reform on both 
domestic and international levels.292 Our recommended domestic law reforms 
are twofold. First, the United States should add extraterritorial applicability to 
criminal laws bearing on cyber-attack. Second, the United States should utilize 
limited countermeasures, as appropriate, to combat cyber-attacks that do not 
rise to the level of armed attacks under the law of war. 
These domestic measures will address elements of the problem, but 
getting at the root of the global cyber-attack challenge will require international 
solutions. We therefore recommend an international cyber-treaty with two 
central aims. First, such an agreement should provide a definition of cyber-
attacks and cyber-warfare that limits the cyber-attacks to which states may 
respond with force. Second, the treaty should empower states to cooperate in 
evidence collection and criminal prosecution of individuals involved in 
transnational cyber-attacks. While this second aim will likely be a longer-term 
project, it offers the only truly effective solution to the inherently international 
problem of cyber-attacks. 
291. See Andy Johnson & Kyle Spector, Deterring Cyber War: A U.S.-Led Cybersecurity 
Summit, THIRD WAY 3 (Oct. 2010), available at http://content.thirdway.org/publications/343/Third_ 
Way_Idea_Brief_-_Deterring_Cyber_War-A_US-Led_Cybersecurity_Summit.pdf (last visited Apr. 
22, 2012). 
292. We focus here on potential legal reforms. In addition to legal reform, government should 
coordinate with the private sector to address cyber-attack threats. Indeed, the Obama administration 
has recognized that “[e]nsuring the resilience of our networks and information systems requires 
collective and concerted national action that spans the whole of government, in collaboration with the 
private sector and individual citizens.” WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 13. 
The U.S. Department of Defense has also suggested that there may be a need for “incentives or other 
measures . . . to promote private sector participation.” DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 9. The legal 
reforms outlined here are meant to compliment such cooperative measures, not substitute for them. 
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A. Battling Cyber-Attacks at Home 
1. Extend the Extraterritorial Reach of Domestic Law 
As noted above, a number of existing and proposed domestic laws may 
play a role in combating cyber-attacks, including numerous criminal statutes 
regulating harmful cyber-activity outside the context of armed conflict.293 It is 
important to recall that domestic criminal law alone cannot regulate cyber-
attacks because not all cyber-attacks are defined as cyber-crimes. But many 
cyber-attacks—including those involving non–state actors and computer-based 
means—are also cyber-crimes that fall within the ambit of domestic criminal 
law.294 Unfortunately, only a small number of existing criminal laws that might 
govern cyber-attacks explicitly provide for extraterritorial reach.295 
To remedy this limitation, legislators could amend domestic criminal 
statutes to give them extraterritorial reach. If other states reciprocate by making 
their own criminal statutes pertaining to cyber-attacks extraterritorial as well, 
this could greatly increase global enforcement.296 Indeed, increased domestic 
enforcement through extraterritorial application will be much more successful 
and legitimate if it takes place in concert with the creation of an international 
treaty that establishes basic shared standards regarding cyber-attacks. 
Even if domestic criminal laws that apply to cyber-attacks extend across 
borders, jurisdictional hurdles will likely hamper enforcement by any 
individual state. It may be difficult, for example, for the United States to gain 
custody of accused cyber-criminals operating abroad, particularly if they are 
not U.S. citizens or operate in countries that do not have extradition treaties 
with the United States. Thus, strengthened extradition relationships around the 
world would complement increased extraterritorial application of domestic law. 
Though dramatic improvement in extradition relationships may not be 
immediately feasible given that extradition treaties, which are negotiated on a 
bilateral basis, take substantial time and effort to negotiate and pass, such 
relationships could help effectuate the prosecution of many crimes resulting 
from increasing globalization including drug, weapon, and human trafficking, 
and transnational white-collar crime.297 Thus, the United States should 
prioritize the development of these relationships moving forward. 
Further, the United States, and the global community in general, should 
endeavor to explicitly criminalize aspects of cyber-attacks that fall outside the 
293. See supra Part III.D. 
294. See supra Part I.A.3. 
295. See supra Part III.D.  
296. This extraterritorial reach would not regulate cyber-actions taken by governments but 
rather those of individuals and other non–state actors. 
297. See generally John T. Soma, et al., Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes: Are 
New Treaties and Laws Needed?, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 317 (1997) (discussing the limitations of 
current extradition treaties and proposing potential reforms). 
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scope of existing domestic or international law, including the law of war. In the 
present absence of an international cyber-crime agreement, it is possible for the 
United States to more effectively counter cyber-attacks through carefully 
crafted and narrowly framed domestic law. 
2. Countermeasures in Response to Cyber-Attacks 
Although the international law of countermeasures has played a minimal 
role in legal debates around cyber-attacks thus far, it nonetheless offers an 
extremely useful legal framework for states seeking to respond to a cyber-
attack. The United States and other countries interested in regulating cyber-
attacks should begin to develop a policy defining the types of countermeasures 
legally and strategically appropriate for different types of cyber-attacks. 
As noted in the discussion of jus ad bellum above, the vast majority of 
cyber-attacks do not rise to the level of an armed attack.298 But armed self-
defense is not the only manner in which states can respond to cyber-attacks. 
Provided that the initial cyber-attack violates an international obligation of the 
perpetrating state, the victim state is entitled under customary international law 
to employ necessary and proportional countermeasures designed to induce the 
perpetrating state to resume compliance with international norms and to stop 
conducting (or allowing) cyber-attacks from its territory.299 
While active defense is the most commonly discussed type of 
countermeasure that might be employed in response to a cyber-attack, it is only 
one option among many.300 A key limit to a legally permissible countermeasure 
is that it must be proportional to the injury suffered by the victim state.301 
Moreover, countermeasures must be designed to enable a return to the status 
quo ante, in which both the perpetrating and victim states comply with their 
relevant legal duties towards one another.302 Countermeasures must be 
temporary so that once the cyber-attacks stop, the countermeasure may stop as 
well and normal international relations may resume.303 
The Draft Articles on State Responsibility express a preference for 
reciprocal countermeasures, but this is not a requirement.304 Still, the closer the 
relationship between the breach and countermeasure the more likely the 
countermeasure is to be proportional and therefore lawful.305 The United States 
should consider in advance what international obligations it has toward likely 
cyber-aggressor states that it might lawfully revoke in case of an unlawful 
298. See supra Part II.A. 
299. See Draft Articles, supra note 109, art. 49. 
300. See Sklerov, supra note 93, at 2 n.5 (comparing active and passive defenses). 
301. See Draft Articles, supra note 109, art. 51. 
302. See id. art. 49(1). 
303. See id. art. 49. 
304. See id. pt. 3, ch. 2, cmt., ¶ 5. 
305. Id. 
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cyber-attack. Indeed, the United States could develop a policy regarding the 
types of countermeasures legally available in response to particular types of 
cyber-attacks. 
B. A Cyber-Attack Treaty 
Changes in domestic law and policy, such as adding extraterritorial reach 
to criminal laws and planning for the use of countermeasures, are valuable legal 
responses to the threat of cyber-attack. Yet to truly address the cyber-attack 
challenge, international coordination will be necessary.306 The scope of the 
problem is global, and the solution must be as well. As the U.S. Department of 
Defense has explained, “cyberspace is a network of networks that includes 
thousands of ISPs [internet service providers] across the globe; no single state 
or organization can maintain effective cyber defenses on its own.”307 
The United States has developed a Cyberspace Strategy that emphasizes 
working “with like-minded states to establish an environment of expectations, 
or norms of behavior, that ground foreign and defense polices and guide 
international partnerships.”308 While the development of international norms is 
useful, it will not provide governments and private actors with the clarity of a 
codified definition of cyber-attack or written guidelines on how states should 
respond to certain types of challenges. For this reason, we recommend that the 
international community create a multilateral agreement with two central 
features. First, it must offer a shared definition of cyber-crime, cyber-attack, 
and cyber-warfare.309 Second, it should offer a framework for more robust 
international cooperation in information sharing, evidence collection, and 
criminal prosecution of those participating in cross-national cyber-attacks. That 
framework should be attentive to the challenges of overcriminalization, 
maintaining room for individuals to use the Internet and related technologies to 
engage in lawful dissent.310 
306. As discussed in Part III.B, there have already been several efforts to create a cyber-attack 
treaty. See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 7, at 268–71 (arguing for a Cyber War Limitations Treaty); 
cf. JACK GOLDSMITH, CYBERSECURITY TREATIES: A SKEPTICAL VIEW (2011) (offering a skeptical 
take on the possibility of a cyber-security treaty). Russia has for some time been proposing a treaty 
banning cyber-attack. See, e.g., John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, U.S. and Russia Differ on Treaty 
for Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at A1 (“Russia favors an international treaty along the 
lines of those negotiated for chemical weapons and has pushed for that approach at a series of 
meetings . . . and in public statements . . . .”). Yet the shape of the agreement proposed here is quite 
different—it begins with securing a shared agreement on the activity meant to be prohibited.  
307. DOD STRATEGY, supra note 32, at 9. 
308. WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 9. The United States is 
currently prepared to build bilateral and multilateral partnerships, to work with regional organizations, 
and to collaborate with the private sector. See id. at 12. 
309. It is worth noting again that cyber-attacks that do constitute use of force under the law of 
war are already covered by jus in bello principles, which may be more clearly defined over time in the 
cyber-attack context through state practice. See also supra Part II.B. 
310. See WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 7. 
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1. Define Cyber-Attack and Cyber-Warfare 
The first aim of a cyber-attack treaty regime should be to develop a shared 
definition of cyber-attack, cyber-crime, and cyber-warfare. These definitions 
could serve as the foundation for domestic criminal legislation targeting cyber-
attacks and cyber-crime as well as more extensive international cooperation. A 
similar strategy has been used, for example, in the international effort to battle 
bribery: the OECD Bribery Convention provides a definition of bribery that 
state parties then integrate into national legislation forbidding the practice.311 
Under the Bribery Convention, “signatories pledged to criminalize and 
prosecute the bribery of foreign public officials.”312 The thirty-eight state 
parties have then used that shared definition as the basis for domestic 
implementing legislation.313 
We have proposed a definition of cyber-attack that would include any 
action taken to undermine the function of a computer network for a political or 
national security purpose. An appropriate definition of cyber-crime would 
include any violation of criminal law by non–state actors, committed by means 
of a computer system. Finally, cyber-warfare should be defined as a cyber-
attack that causes physical injury or property damage comparable to a 
conventional armed attack. 
States could adopt a clear definition of cyber-attack, cyber-crime, and 
cyber-warfare in the context of a comprehensive binding treaty, nonbinding 
declaration, or through independent agreements in anticipation of more broad-
based future cooperation. Even a stand-alone nonbinding defining declaration 
could provide an important starting point for future cooperation if it provides a 
definition that is later incorporated into a more comprehensive international 
treaty.314 Such a document could offer much-needed clarity on when cyber-
311. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 4 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Bribery Convention]. Under the 
Convention, the “Offense of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials” is defined as  
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether 
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third 
party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of 
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the 
conduct of international business. 
Id. art. 1(1). 
312. Developments in the Law – Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1285 (2011); 
see OECD Bribery Convention, supra note 311, art 1(1) (“Each Party shall take such measures as may 
be necessary to establish that [bribery] is a criminal offence under its law.”).  
313. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: National Implementing Legislation, ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_ 
1,00.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). Unfortunately, it appears that few countries have actually been 
enforcing the domestic antibribery provisions. See Developments in the Law, supra note 312, at 1285. 
314. The idea that a nonbinding, defining declaration can provide a basis for negotiating a 
subsequent binding treaty is illustrated by the successful U.N. effort to criminalize torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Before the Convention Against Torture was adopted by the 
U.N. General Assembly in 1984, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration Against Torture. 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 
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attacks amount to an armed conflict that warrants self-defense,315 and could 
offer a common reference point for subsequent domestic criminal legislation. 
Even an agreement limited to common definitions will likely face 
challenges.316 In particular, it will be necessary to bridge fairly substantial 
divides between the United States and other leading cyber-powers that have a 
more expansive view of what activity ought to be criminalized through 
international cooperation, including some forms of legitimate political 
dissent.317 As noted earlier, Russia and other members of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization have been promoting an international agreement 
banning cyber-attack for some time,318 but their focus differs greatly from that 
of the United States and much of Europe in the cyber-attack arena.319 A key 
challenge of this first stage agreement will thus be to find common ground with 
major cyber-powers without expanding the definition of cyber-attack in ways 
that would quell free speech and democratic political organization. 
2. International Cooperation on Evidence Collection and Criminal Prosecution 
Once states develop a shared definition of cyber-attacks, cyber-crime, and 
cyber-warfare, the next step is more extensive cooperation among states on 
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]; CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST 
TORTURE: AN ASSESSMENT 73 (2001). The Declaration described consensus on key elements of the 
definition of torture. These included “the infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering,” 
intentional infliction of pain and suffering, the action or sanction of a public official, and conduct that 
serves a proscribed purpose, “such as obtaining information or a confession.” Id. at 70. The 
Declaration provided much of the substance that later was incorporated into the Convention Against 
Torture, which has been ratified by 149 states, including the United States. See Status, Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (last visited Nov. 8, 
2011). In fact, the Swedish draft of the Convention, which formed the basis of the negotiations, used 
the exact text of the definition of torture from the Declaration. INGELSE, supra, at 74. Unfortunately, 
the draft Sweden submitted to the 34th Session, E/CN.4/1285, is not available on the U.N. Documents 
database.  
315. The White House predicts that shared understanding about norms of acceptable cyber-
behavior will bring “predictability to state conduct, helping prevent the misunderstandings that could 
lead to conflict.” WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 9. As a result, the strategy 
commits the United States to take the lead in building consensus on norms of cyber-behavior. Id. at 18. 
316. Indeed, some have suggested that a successful treaty may be nearly impossible to achieve, 
at least in the short term. See, e.g., Waxman, supra note 24, at 425–26 (“[N]ot only do certain features 
of cyber-activities make international legal regulation very difficult, but major actors also have 
divergent strategic interests that will pull their preferred doctrinal interpretations and aspirations in 
different directions, impeding formation of a stable international consensus.”); GOLDSMITH, supra 
note 306, at 12 (“This paper has argued that the fundamental clash of interests concerning the 
regulation of electronic communications, the deep constraints the United States would have to adopt to 
receive reciprocal benefits in a cybersecurity treaty, and the debilitating verification problems will 
combine to make it unfeasible to create a cybersecurity treaty that purports to constrain 
governments.”). For a dissenter’s view on the appropriate international response to cyber-attack, see 
Duncan B. Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373 (2011) (arguing for a duty to 
assist cyber-threat victims, rather than regulation of bad cyber-actors). 
317. See supra text accompanying notes 21–26. 
318. See Markoff & Kramer, supra note 306. 
319. See supra text accompanying notes 24–26.  
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information sharing, evidence collection, and criminal prosecution of those 
involved in cyber-attacks. A useful starting point for building such a treaty is 
the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, described in Part III.B.3, 
which provides for harmonized regulation of a wide range of cyber-crimes. 
This treaty remains largely limited to Europe (though the United States has 
ratified the agreement) and it does not address all cyber-attacks that a 
comprehensive agreement would ideally regulate.320 Nonetheless, it provides a 
framework from which a more comprehensive agreement might begin. 
Building on this framework, the new agreement should require parties to 
pass domestic laws banning the cyber-attack-related conduct prohibited under 
the treaty, so as to harmonize laws across states. The agreement could begin 
with information-sharing, layering on additional mechanisms for fostering 
cooperation in identifying and stopping the sources of cyber-attacks through 
criminal law enforcement agencies. International cooperation in information 
sharing could be an extremely valuable complement to other regulation of 
cyber-attacks.321 
Member states could agree to share access to cyber-related information 
with other member states. That information would not be available to 
nonmembers or to states that fail to comply with the treaty’s core obligations. 
Offering privileged access to information to member states in good standing 
would provide states with an incentive to participate in and comply with the 
treaty regime.322 
Finally, consistent with the Tunis Commitment323 and Agenda,324 a treaty 
could encourage more-technologically-developed countries to assist less-
developed ones in responding to shared cyber-threats. As the recent White 
House Cyberspace Strategy memo observed, 
Enhancing national-level cybersecurity among developing nations is of 
immediate and long-term benefit [to the United States and all nations], 
as more states are equipped to confront threats emanating from within 
their borders and in turn, build confidence in globally interconnected 
320. Convention on Cybercrime, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, COUNCIL OF EUR. 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2012), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185& 
CL=ENG. Canada, Japan, and South Africa are the other non-European signatories, but the United 
States is the only one of the four that has ratified the Convention. Id. 
321. Information sharing in this context was endorsed by a group of experts from countries as 
diverse as the United States, China, and Russia in a 2010 report to the U.N. Secretary-General. Report 
of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, supra note 186, at 8. 
322. This proposal aims to harness the power of outcasting to build a strong treaty regime. See 
Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: The Enforcement of Domestic and International Law, 
121 YALE L. J. 252 (2011). 
323. Tunis Commitment, WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFO. SOC’Y (Nov. 18, 2005), 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/7.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
324. Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFO. SOC’Y (Nov. 
18, 2005), http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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networks and cooperate across borders to combat criminal misuse of 
information technologies. It is also essential to cultivating dynamic, 
international research communities able to take on next-generation 
challenges to cybersecurity.325 
Because any country’s cyber-security can be compromised by its allies’ 
security gaps, a collective attempt to prevent cyber-attacks must include efforts 
to improve the defenses of partner countries as well.326 
Another challenge to any comprehensive cyber-attack treaty is the 
difficulty of verifying where cyber-attacks originate.327 Uncertainty in tracing 
and attributing a cyber-attack “makes retaliation for breach much harder for 
any president or general to order.”328 Yet while verification of a cyber-attack’s 
origin is difficult, even those who have expressed skepticism about the short-
term feasibility of a cyber-treaty acknowledge that it is not impossible. As Jack 
Goldsmith has put it, “Sometimes traceback and related forensic tools can 
provide good-enough attribution.”329 Indeed, while negotiations on the treaty 
are underway, states should continue a parallel technical effort to enhance their 
capacities to trace the source of cyber-attacks. 
As General Keith Alexander, chief of the new U.S. Cyber Command, 
explained earlier this year when reopening negotiations with Russia on this 
issue, “We do have to establish the lanes of the road” for what cyber-activities 
governments can and cannot pursue.330 Establishing those lanes is the necessary 
first step to addressing the challenge of cyber-attacks. Only once they are in 
place will verification challenges become salient. 
CONCLUSION 
The emergence of Stuxnet in 2010 heralded a new era for cyber-attacks. 
Although its damage was apparently limited to the Iranian nuclear program it 
was designed to attack, it revealed how vulnerable even nation-states are to 
cyber-attacks. Indeed, by the time it was discovered, Stuxnet had wormed its 
way into computer networks around the world. 
Cyber-attacks on vital infrastructure are already becoming widespread. 
Cyber-security professionals report that the computer infrastructure has become 
more vulnerable even in just a year.331 And yet, while the threat of cyber-
325. WHITE HOUSE CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 63, at 15. 
326. Shanker & Bumiller, supra note 53 (noting that the United States’ allies are “all over the 
map” on cyber-security issues, according to James Lewis, an expert on computer network warfare at 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies). 
327. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 306, at 10–12. 
328. Id. at 11.  
329. Id. at 10. 
330. Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Backs Talks on Cyber Warfare, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2010, at A3. 
331. Mark Clayton, Security Lags Cyberattack Threats in Critical Industries, Report Finds, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0420/Security-lags-
cyberattack-threats-in-critical-industries-report-finds (citing a global survey of 200 computer security 
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attacks has rapidly grown, the response has not kept pace. This Article has 
shown that both the U.S. government and the international community have 
thus far largely failed to update legal frameworks that might respond to cyber-
attacks. To face new and growing threats, governments continue to rely on 
limited and piecemeal bodies of law not designed to meet the challenge of 
cyber-attacks. 
It is past time to begin a conversation about the scope of the threat posed 
by cyber-attacks and the best ways to meet it. The United States should expand 
the reach of domestic law abroad and develop a system for utilizing limited 
countermeasures where appropriate to respond to certain types of cyber-attacks. 
Yet the United States is restricted in what it can accomplish alone. Cyber-
attacks are often transnational—designed by authors in multiple countries, run 
through networks across the world, and used to undermine computer systems in 
countries where those designing the attack have never set foot. This global 
threat may only be effectively met by a global solution—by the international 
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